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Abstract  
 
The importance of high quality infrastructure and its maintenance lies in its ability to 
stimulate economic growth as it fuels business activities, creates job opportunities, markets 
product, and generates earnings (Yakcop, 2006a). In consideration of this importance, the 
public sector encourages private sector participation in the delivery of public services and 
infrastructure in terms of funding and expertise. A successful Public Private Partnership
1
 
(PPP) is one vehicle used internationally. Both New Zealand and Malaysia acknowledge 
the potential of PPPs in delivering high quality infrastructure and services to the general 
public. Consequently, both countries made a move towards PPPs by creating PPP-
specialized units and producing PPP guidelines. However, thus far, Malaysia has been 
more active in pursuing PPPs when compared to New Zealand‘s cautious approach to PPPs. 
Hence, the purpose of this thesis is to find out the reasoning behind this trend. Issues 
relevant to reasons for implementing PPPs, features of PPPs, allocation of risks, 
performance indicators and accounting for PPPs are analysed to justify this trend. This 
thesis finds that the Malaysian ―Vision 2020‖ has signalled a government preference for 
PPPs, including its ability to encourage bumiputera
2
 participation. Further, the government 
has developed a system involving Special Purpose Vehicles and utilizing government-held 
superannuation funds for project finance aid. Consequently, the system reduces the transfer 
of risk from the public sector to the private sector partners. This has transcended the major 
issue in New Zealand where the lack of a competitive market has restricted the 
development of PPPs. A lack of public support has also contributed to New Zealand‘s PPP 
under-development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 Known as Kerjasama Awam Swasta in Malay language 
2 The word bumiputera refers to the indigenous people of Malaysia 
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1. Introduction to PPPs 
 
Country leaders noted the need for high quality infrastructure to reduce potential damage, 
to minimize loss of lives, and to support the survivors in the events of natural disasters 
such as earthquakes, tsunami, flood and landslide. The importance of high quality 
infrastructure and its maintenance lies in its ability to stimulate economic growth as it fuels 
business activities, creates job opportunities, markets product, and generates earnings 
(Yakcop, 2006a). In consideration of this importance, the public sector encourages private 
sector participation in the delivery of public services and infrastructure in terms of funding 
and expertise. A successful Public Private Partnership
3
 (PPP) encourages this. A PPP, for 
the purpose of this paper, refers to a concession agreement involving (NIU
4
, 2009, p. 1; 
3PU
5
, 2009. p. 4):  
1. a long term partnership between a public sector partner (procurer) and a private 
sector partner (provider/operator);  
2. delivery of public services; 
3. construction of an asset or enhancement of an existing asset;  
4. where the private sector partner finances, builds, operates, and maintains the asset 
(transfer of risks from public sector to private sector); 
5. and the public sector partner compensates private sector partner for the public 
services (or payments may flow directly from public users); and  
6. optional transfer of the asset to the public sector at the end of the contract. 
 
The details of the partnership arrangements are contractually dependent, but a PPP cannot 
transfer the ultimate accountability for public service provision from the government to the 
private sector. In 2009, New Zealand and Malaysia published PPP guidelines respectively 
entitled Guidance for Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in New Zealand and Public 
Private Partnership (PPP) Guideline (also known as Garis Panduan Kerjasama Awam 
Swasta) which provide PPP comprehension for the interested parties. Both guidelines are 
intended for long term contracts between the government and its private sector partners, in 
which the private sector will finance, construct, operate and/or enhance existing facilities 
or assets. Their ownership may revert to the government at the end of the contract if the 
asset is not obsolete.  In return, the private sector partners will be compensated based on 
their performances as contractually agreed. It is noted that both guidelines are prepared in 
                                               
3 Known as Kerjasama Awam Swasta in Malay language 
4 National Infrastructure Unit 
5 Public Private Partnership Unit 
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realization that the notion of PPP is not exhaustive. Hence, these guidelines are subjected 
to on-going revisions.  
 
A PPP is distinct from its alternatives such as outsourcing, contracting out, New Public 
Management, and privatization, partly because it requires both public and private sectors to 
join forces for the benefit of the general public. Malaysia‘s Public Private Partnership Unit 
(3PU) (2009, p. 6-7) presented these differences: 
 
Figure 1 Differentiating conventional procurement, a PPP and privatization 
 
Conventional PPP Privatization 
Funding via direct public 
budget 
Funding via private financial 
resources without public 
sector‘s explicit guarantee 
Funding via private financial 
resources without implicit or 
explicit public sector 
guarantee 
Immediate impact on public 
sector financial position 
Impact on public budget 
spreads over the duration of 
the concession 
No impact on the level of 
public sector expenditure 
Risks are entirely borne by 
public sector 
Risks are allocated to parties 
which can manage them 
most efficiently  
Risks are entirely borne by 
the private sector  
Extensive public sector 
involvement at all stages of 
project life 
Public sector‘s involvement 
is through enforcement of 
pre-agreed KPIs 
Government acts as 
regulator  
Short term relationship with 
private contractors  
Long term relationship with 
private contractors  
Long term relationship with 
private contractors   
Applicable for projects with 
high socio-economic returns 
and those justified on 
strategic considerations 
Applicable for projects with 
commercial viability 
Applicable for projects with 
high commercial viability  
 
As a PPP is output driven, it also motivates the private sector partner to innovate in 
delivering services and maintaining the assets. Takim, Abdul-Rahman, Ismail and Egbu 
(2008, p. 80) conducted research on the differences between a Private Finance Initiative (a 
subset of PPP, henceforth PFI) and a traditional procurement. They (Takim et al, 2008, p. 
80) noted that a PFI differs from traditional procurement as it should: improve asset 
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maintenance; benefit local economic development; facilitate innovation; reduce public 
sector administration cost; enhance government capacity; and solve the problem of public 
sector budget restraint. Most importantly, PFIs (and PPPs) are advocated to enable the 
transfer of risks from the public procurer to the private sector provider.  
 
Ismail and Yusof (2009b, p. 79 & p. 83) also noted that privatization focuses on selected 
economic infrastructure, particularly utilities, transport sectors and selected services of 
local governments whereas PFIs serve the wider economic sectors of utility, transport, 
education, health, office accommodation, housing, defence equipment and other types of 
public buildings and infrastructures. This difference may be due to the need for effective 
government monitoring and supervision that are required in a PPP to ensure conformance 
to government‘s standards, as against selective privatization which requires limited 
supervision.  
 
From Figure 1 it can be seen that public expenditure level, risks, public sector involvement, 
duration of relationship with the private contractors, and project practicability differentiate 
a conventional procurement, a PPP and privatization. These differences have led to varying 
results, both favourable and unfavourable depending on the project‘s management and 
other external factors. Conventional procurement has been blamed for inferior works 
requiring high maintenance costs. Conversely, privatization has been associated with the 
delivery of high quality infrastructure, but at higher costs. Being in the middle of the 
contrasting conventional procurement and privatization, a PPP has been perceived as a 
combination of both which enhances the pros and minimizes the cons of the two ends (The 
Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnership, 2005).  
 
A PPP can take on many forms as it is modifiable to meet country specific needs. These 
variations include (Network Strategies, 2008, p. 29): 
1. traditional design and construction, whereby the public sector commissions the 
private sector to build the facility under a contract, typically for a fixed price; 
2. operation and maintenance contract, where the private sector operates a publicly 
owned facility under contract to the public sector; 
3. lease – develop – operate (LDO), where the private sector is awarded a long-term 
lease to operate and possibly to expand a facility; 
4. build – own – maintain (BOM), where the private sector constructs, owns and 
maintains the facility, while the public sector leases and operates the facility; 
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5. build – own – operate – transfer (BOOT), where the private sector finances, 
constructs, owns and operates the facility for a specified timeframe after which 
ownership reverts to the public sector; or 
6. build – own – operate (BOO), similar to the BOOT model but the private sector 
owns the facility in perpetuity. 
 
While the guidelines for New Zealand and Malaysia are in place, the role of PPPs 
continues to evolve. Further, internationally, PPPs do not always meet the expectations. 
This thesis seeks to identify the cause(s) of Malaysia having more PPPs than New Zealand, 
despite the necessity for both governments to provide for high quality infrastructure. For 
this reason, this thesis will analyse the reasons for PPPs, the key elements of PPPs and to 
highlight the differences that exist in the New Zealand and Malaysian contexts.  
 
The drive to opt for PPPs may be partly explained by the rational choice theory which will 
be applied in understanding the existence of PPPs. The next chapter will look at reasons for 
choosing PPPs, including the origins of PPPs in both countries. Continuing on, the success 
factors of PPPs which including features and risk allocation will be presented. Then, 
performance indicators will be discussed, followed by accounting issues of PPPs in the two 
countries. Subsequently, the challenges and issues that emerge with a PPP implementation 
will be discussed. The conclusion includes the limitations and further opportunities for 
research in this area. 
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2. Reasons for PPPs  
 
Rational choice theory could justify the preference for PPPs to an extent. This theory is 
based on optimizing decisions and actions. It requires assessing the costs and benefits of 
each alternative to maximize utility or minimize disutility. Rationality results from the 
choice of action that corresponds with the optimal choice (Moll & Hoque, 2006, p. 8). A 
number of researchers have deemed PPPs as the optimal choice partly due to reports that 
well-managed PPP projects could overcome the problems associated with other 
procurement methods as seen in the United Kingdom and Australia. For an example, in the 
United Kingdom, PFIs combine the best of public and private provision rather than 
regarding the two as mutually exclusive (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2005, p. 58). However, in 
choosing a PPP project, the search for suitable partners and decisions about PPP elements 
such as allocation of risks, and thorough examinations of available options must be done 
scrupulously to ensure that the end result is optimal and utility-maximizing or disutility-
minimizing. Hence, it appears that PPPs can theoretically provide rationality amid the 
identified constraints and resources. 
 
In practice, Ng and Loosemore (2007, p. 68) believe that the appeal of PPPs lies in the shift 
of funding responsibility to the private sector which simultaneously reduces public debt, 
reduces finance costs, and most importantly allows investment in other areas of public 
interest such as education and welfare. They (2007, p. 68) added that with PPPs, the public 
sector could reduce its in-house project management, maintenance workforce, and 
equipment needs which consequently releases additional funds for other public services 
investments. Attractively, projects that would have been delayed or halted with 
conventional procurement could be resumed and potentially delivered earlier because of 
the finance capacity of the entire private sector (Ng & Loosemore, 2007, p. 68). Ostensibly, 
these claims suggest that PPPs could practically provide additional benefits to government 
(and society) that other procurement methods may not be able to provide. In light of 
rational choice theory, choosing PPPs appears to be an appropriate reaction to existing 
procurement problems. 
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2.1. Origin of PPPs 
 
Historically, the emergence of a PPP was related to the concerns around increasing public 
debt levels. In order to deliver public services, the government had to find other ways to 
fund infrastructure. Hence private sector participation in public service delivery emerged 
as a viable alternative to combat increasing debt. Since then, Hammami, Ruhashyankiko 
and Yehoue (2006) hypothesized that PPP determinants could be influenced by 
government constraints, the political environment, market conditions and macroeconomic 
policies, institutional quality and a country‘s legal system, government‘s past experiences 
with PPPs, and private participation in PPPs. These hypothesized determinants represent 
the likelihood of PPPs‘ presence in a given environment. Higher government constraints, a 
stable political environment, viable market conditions and macroeconomic policies, a 
strong institutional quality and legal system that protects investor‘s rights, experiences with 
past PPPs and the acceptable extent of private participation in PPPs could positively affect 
government, leading to the choice to undertake more PPPs.  
 
Hammami, et al. (2006) found that there are more PPP projects in an environment with 
large markets and high demand for infrastructure, governments burdened by high debts, 
macroeconomic stability  (i.e. stable inflation), low corruption, strong rule of law, stable 
institutional and legal frameworks, and edifying past experiences with PPPs. They 
additionally found that political stability does not statistically influence the number of 
PPPs. However, the high use of PPPs in the United Kingdom and Australia suggest that 
there will be more PPPs in a country where the countries are politically stable, owing to the 
low PPP resistance that allows for political commitment to PPPs (Hallyar & Wettenhall, 
2010, p. S4). This greater take up is because a PPP involves a long term commitment that 
will legally bind the government to the private sector and a stable government will provide 
comfort to the private sector. Governments‘ reputations are also a factor. A transparent and 
honest government is desired by the private sector partners so that their participation will 
not be stained by corruption. Similarly, governments need to engage reputable and 
trustworthy partners for PPPs. 
 
PPPs are also more likely to develop in a country that politically accepts them. As for the 
level of investment, it is basically influenced by funding availability which can be 
somewhat politically influenced. Hammami, et al.‘s (2006) research also shows that market 
conditions appear to be the most common determinant in the energy, telecommunication, 
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transportation and water sectors. The outcome of their research suggests that PPPs emerge 
as a rational choice after evaluating the environment that warrants the need for a PPP.   
 
 
2.1.1. Origin of PPPs - New Zealand 
 
New Zealand has many of the factors that Hammami et al. (2006) suggested were 
necessary to give rise to the emergence of PPPs. High government debt is a current issue, 
also there is political and economic stability, low corruption, a stable institutional and legal 
framework, well-functioning market and a high demand for infrastructure. However, the 
Chief Executive of the New Zealand Council for Infrastructure Development, Stephen 
Selwood, admitted that New Zealand was lagging in terms of improved infrastructure 
development despite the potential of PPPs. The Press (Partnership report card varied, 2007, 
p. 15) quoted him saying that ―PPPs are being used extensively worldwide to bridge the 
gap between infrastructure demand and the limitations of public funds.‖ The New Zealand 
Land Transport Management Act (NZLTMA) 2003 empowers public road controlling 
authorities to enter into concession agreements between a third party and a public road 
controlling authority relating to the construction or operation of a roading activity. Yet it 
appears there is still some reluctance to use the Act opportunistically.  Furthermore, the 
Treasury in 2006 concluded that there was little that a PPP could do for New Zealand 
(Owles, 20008).  
 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2005, p. 59) believe that the past experience with privatization 
contributes to this reluctance because if the UK and Australian privatization programs 
were far from an unqualified success, New Zealand fared even worse. The political and 
economic aftermath of New Zealand‘s privatization programme and the association of 
PPPs with these debacles have a pessimistic effect on PPPs (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2003, 
p. 335).  
 
Owles (2008) had another take on the slowness of PPP take-up, noting that the NZLTMA 
2003 has not been applied because of high implementation costs, small market size, and 
the inflexibility of PPP arrangements (Owles, 2008). The Auckland Regional Council 
officers, for example, do not favour private sector involvement and they believe that there 
is no advantage in using such a device [PPP] to complete Auckland's western ring 
motorway network by 2015 (Dearnaley, 2008). According to them: 
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―…Transit and Government funding agency Land Transport NZ have already in 
recent years developed procurement systems which are "much more flexible and 
innovative" than past practices in sharing risk between public-sector owners and 
private-sector road-builders. These had led to alliances in which public and private 
sector construction partners shared gains and losses in projects such as the Grafton 
Gully extension to Spaghetti Junction, which was completed under budget and before 
schedule‖ (Dearnaley, 2008). 
Hence, the hold up for PPP development in New Zealand is also fuelled by the public 
belief that New Zealand has a better procurement method, namely project alliance, which 
does not involve private financing or transfer of ownership (OAG, 2006, p. 55).  
 
Despite the opposition to utilizing PPPs for roading projects, there is some support for PPP 
in New Zealand. For example, it was likely to reduce the costs and increase the speed of 
project completion as expressed below: 
 
―…the cost associated with a PPP procurement process was likely to be insignificant 
compared with potential savings, in which every 1 per cent of cost reduction would 
equal $18 million. He said it was unlikely the project could be completed by 2015 
without alternatives to full Government funding, and road tolls would need to be 
considered irrespective of whether a PPP was formed. Assuming tolls were to be 
adopted, a PPP would provide an opportunity to assess the desirability of transferring 
revenue risk from the public to the private sector‖ (Dearnaley, 2008). 
 
This is one of the responses for PPPs with regards to the $1.89 billion Waterview 
motorway tunnels project. The reported interviewee believes that to complete the project 
additional funding and road pricing will be unavoidable. Also arguing for PPPs, Tim 
Stone
6
 believes that significant long-term cost savings would be available to taxpayers by 
allowing the private sector to supply expensive infrastructure such as new roads, schools, 
prisons, hospitals and military training (The Dominion Post, 2009). This is because the 
government will not have to pay the full amount of the delivered assets immediately since 
the selected private operator is paid an annual fee to provide the facilities, over a long-term 
contract of 15 years minimum (The Dominion Post, 2009). The potential for cost savings 
depends on the accuracy of the assumptions built into the chosen formula. Also, penalty 
                                               
6 KPMG Chairman of Global Infrastructure and Projects 
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clauses
7
 designed to combat underutilization of facilities‘ real capacity influence the net 
revenue to government (The Dominion Post, 2009). These penalties serve as continuous 
motivators for the service providers. However, it is important to note that PPPs are not 
meant for softer services such as clinical care because if these services are not be profitable, 
the public sector ethos might clash with private sector motivation (The Dominion Post, 
2009). The consequences of this motivation include exclusion of poorer public from much 
needed services. It is likely that these services will remain the responsibility of the 
government from start to finish.  
Currently, the Government of New Zealand has also been showing interest in PPPs and is 
keen to use PPPs for prisons and schools (School property PPP moves to next stage, 2010). 
This appears to suggest that PPPs are seen as a rational choice for prisons and schools but 
not for roading projects. This might be due to a public aversion to road tolls.  
 
Evidently, apart from the Central Government, the Local Government also has a key role 
to play in PPPs including existing and emerging initiatives, engagement in application 
processes for public broadband funding and its role in facilitating infrastructure 
deployment processes (Network Strategies, 2008, p. v). However, the government could be 
distorting the market by entering an agreement with a specific industry player or backing a 
particular technology (Network Strategies, 2008, p. 30). This relates to the need 
highlighted by Hammami et al. (2006) for a large market. So, Network Strategies suggests 
that it will be better to use technology-neutral competitive tenders in selecting private 
sector partners while focusing on the desired outcomes, thus granting flexibility in the 
private sector approach (Network Strategies, 2008, p. 30). The point here seems to be that 
a procurer should be neutral for fair competition. This means that there should not be any 
specific preferences that would cause favouritism or would appear to cause favouritism. 
This can often be obtained through market practices.   
 
Network Strategies also noted that the government and users/customers would be locked in 
with the selected private sector partner for a long time. This in turn would tempt the private 
sector partner to want to be secured against some level of uncertainties. For this concern, it 
is advisable to (Network Strategies, 2008, p. 30): 
1. separate parts of the PPP project, for example having different companies build and 
operate a network; 
                                               
7 In the case of a hospital, the contract would allow for deductions for underutilization e.g. an operating 
theatre was out of service, or a ward was shut down (The Dominion Post, 2009). 
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2. consult industry beforehand regarding ownership, divesture and replacement rules, to 
be included in the PPP contract; and  
3. limit the service contract to a number of years, after which the public partner 
determines whether to continue with the chosen private partner, or to conduct a new 
tender.  
 
These issues suggest that the hurdles against PPPs in New Zealand are derived from 
scepticism about PPPs. They could distort the boundaries that differentiate the private 
sector from the public sector. Even so, the current government appears optimistic that PPP 
has a lot to offer for the betterment of New Zealanders. New Zealand acknowledges the 
following advantages and disadvantages (NIU, 2009, p. 12): 
 
Figure 2 Advantages and disadvantages of PPPs 
 
Advantages 
1. Whole of life cost savings i.e. construction and ongoing operating and 
maintenance costs 
2. Financing cost savings during construction 
3. Greater user benefits 
4. Potential access to additional revenue sources i.e. creativity to extract more 
value from the infrastructure via property development or advertising, etc 
5. Greater cost certainty, thus better decision making by the public sector 
6. Greater community benefits 
7. Potential on time and within budget completion  
8. Risk transfer that provides the incentive for obtaining the benefits mentioned 
above 
9. PPPs may offer finance for projects via off-balance sheet financing which 
would otherwise be unaffordable
8
 
Disadvantages 
1. Tendering and contracting costs 
2. Cost of contract variations i.e. the additional cost of changing contractual 
provisions 
                                               
8 PPPs that are financed by service payments from government create a liability to make regular payments 
over the life of the project. For accounting purposes, these are treated the same way as the interest that is 
payable on government debt, giving rise to a similar liability on the Crown‘s balance sheet as if the project 
was financed with Crown debt. The provision of private sector finance merely strengthens incentives for 
obtaining the benefits mentioned before (NIU, 2009, p. 12). 
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3. Difficulties with contract enforcement and specification of performance 
dimensions 
 
Based on the advantages, a PPP offers financial and societal benefits but its costs and 
contract enforcement difficulties appear significant in some areas, for example roading. 
Hence, these advantages and disadvantages will need to be properly weighed to avoid 
unnecessary PPP implementations. 
 
 
2.1.2. Origin of PPPs - Malaysia 
 
PPPs in Malaysia have resulted from Malaysia‘s previous privatization program. Malaysia 
focuses on Private Finance Initiative (PFI), a subset of PPP, to improve the shortfall of the 
previous privatization program meant for better value for money (VFM) and more 
stringent control over projects (Takim, Ismail, Nawawi & Jaafar, 2009, p. 105). 
Performance deficiencies in privately-owned and privately-financed public transport 
companies such as Intrakota bus company, Cityliner (Park May) bus company and two 
light rail transit firms namely STAR and PUTRA necessitated government involvement in 
a PPP form. In recognition of the increasing need for better quality infrastructure, the 
Government of Malaysia (GoM) has been encouraging private sector participation to 
finance and contribute to materializing the desired infrastructure, instead of merely relying 
on public funds.  
 
Vision 2020, as introduced by the fourth Prime Minister of Malaysia, to be an 
industrialized and fully developed nation by 2020 with growth rate goals of seven per cent 
per annum
9
 (Nambiar, 2007, p. 18), will need both the GoM and private sectors to join 
forces. Since 1983, Nambiar (2007, p. 17) noted that the GoM‘s development policies and 
strategies have been focusing on synchronizing the private sectors and GoM. This can be 
seen in the 1983 Malaysia Incorporated policy, with cooperation between public and 
private sectors, economic liberalization and deregulation to improve investment policies 
for institutional reforms, and Malaysia‘s Public-Private Partnership10 (PPP) Guidelines. In 
Vision 2020, 12 National Key Economic Areas (NKEAs) are being focused on with 
                                               
9 With the expectation of per capita GDP to reach US$10,000 in 1990 prices compared to the US$2,500 in 
1991 at 1990 prices (Nambiar, 2007, p. 18). 
 
10 The Guidelines uses the general term PPP throughout its document whilst noting that there are subtle 
differences between Public Private Partnership and Private Finance Initiatives. 
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emphasis on private sector participation. They are Oil, Gas and Energy, Palm Oil, 
Financial Services, Tourism, Business Services, Improving Electronics and Electrical, 
Wholesale and Retail, Education, Healthcare, Communications Content and Infrastructure, 
Agriculture and Greater Kuala Lumpur (PEMANDU, 2010). This has seen five different 
plans developed progressively, as shown in Figure 3.  
 
 
 
Following these plans, the 10
th
 Malaysia Plan continues to incorporate PPPs in developing 
Malaysia. Malaysia‘s Economic Planning Unit (EPU) in 2006 defines a PFI in Malaysia as 
an arrangement involving the transfer of financial responsibility, capital investment 
management, services of public sector assets, construction, management, maintenance, 
refurbishment and replacement of public sector assets to the private sector. The private 
sector partner will receive an amount sufficient to ensure returns on asset investment along 
with lease charges that correspond with the level, quality and timeliness of service 
provision so that quality facilities may be transferred to the public sector when the 
concession period has ended (Ismail & Md. Yusof, 2009b, p. 78). According to Aziz 
Bahaman, vice President of Master Builders Association Malaysia (MBAM), a good PFI 
could tackle many of the weaknesses in the existing privatization projects and beneficially 
the GoM could be exempted from the financial and political costs of unsuccessful projects 
(Yusoff, 2007).  
 
Another reason for PFIs is to increase competition among private enterprises and to 
encourage bumiputera participation (Ismail & Md. Yusof, 2009b, p. 79). Involving and 
encouraging private sector participation could help with the issues of the government‘s 
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limited budget, escalated world oil prices, pressure to confront abandoned public projects 
and reduce government‘s financial burdens, and increased taxpayers‘ demand on the 
quality of infrastructure assets and services, because there is no cost to the government to 
use private sector sources in providing assets and services (Ismail & Md. Yusof, 2009b, p. 
76). Although it might appear to be of no cost for the government to use private sector 
sources, it is likely that the private sector partner could have included the cost in the PPP 
contract as a rational choice by the private sector party.  
 
Yakcop (2006b) notes that the GoM is financially willing to support strategic projects in 
which concession income may be lacking, based on merit. Hence, for selected projects, the 
private sector partners can expect to receive limited financial support from the GoM in 
partaking PPPs. As a result, infrastructure financing has since accelerated in highway 
construction, public transportation, ports, communications, water supply and power 
generation (Yakcop, 2006b). Public Works Department director-general Datuk Seri 
Professor Dr. Judin Abdul Karim also refers to PPPs as an exploration of the full potential 
of private sector management, commercial, creative skills, and not simply about the 
financing capital investments (Bigger role for private sector under 10
th
 Plan, 2009). Hence, 
PPP funding will increase because PPPs also offer cost savings
11
 for Budget 2010 and the 
costs can be spread over a longer period (Bigger role for private sector under 10
th
 Plan, 
2009). The savings in capital expenditure, thus the savings of public funds, has enabled the 
GoM to reallocate its limited resources to other sectors of the economy (Ninth Malaysia 
Plan 2006-2010, pp. 226).   
 
Figure 4 summarizes PFI drivers in Malaysia (Takim et al., 2009, p. 107): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
11
 The savings related claim is not without disputes among authors. Some (e.g. Gibson, 2008, English, 2005) 
state that the public sector can access funding more cheaply. As is discussed in section 7.2, these authors 
deem it would be better if the public sector keep on taking on their role as public goods and services procurer 
instead of passing it on to the private sector.  
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Figure 4 PFI drivers in Malaysia 
 
 
* The PSC is discussed further in section 3.1. 
 
 
2.2. Summary 
 
In both countries, PPPs originated from the governmental obligation to serve the general 
public. In particular, infrastructure is needed for nation development and to support the 
lifestyle of the general public. However, the public funds available are limited. For this 
reason, the adoption of a PPP is expected to achieve these aims through quality and timely 
infrastructure as well as relieving the government from some of its current financial 
burdens. Recall that Hammami, et al. (2006) found that there are more PPP projects in an 
environment with large markets and high demand for infrastructure, governments burdened 
by high debts, macroeconomic stability (i.e. stable inflation), low corruption, strong rule of 
law, stable institutional and legal frameworks, and edifying past experience with PPPs. 
Apart from low corruption, Malaysia seems to have these determinants embedded in the 
country which could justify their preference for more PPPs. As for New Zealand, the major 
hindrance for PPP is the absence of a large market (Owles, 2008). Since Hammami et al. 
(2006, p. 20) found evidence that a large market is crucial for PPPs, this absence might 
provide the answer to New Zealand having few PPPs, but this will be explored further in 
this thesis. Public support is also lacking and Broadbent and Laughlin (2005) suggest this 
might be because of negative sentiment around privatization. 
 
Drivers of Malaysia PFI project 
Value for Money 
Influenced by public 
sector comparator (PSC)* 
as prepared by public 
works department 
Efficiency Mobilizing private 
sector funds 
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Without doubt, the private sector can assist in building and maintaining public assets and 
services delivery
12
 as shown by Malaysia (where strongly developed plans are evident) and 
New Zealand (where the legislation and environment appear to support PPP, but few 
projects exist).  Opting for PPPs is, unfortunately, not without its challenges. A 
government is still susceptible to other risks as PFIs allocate risks according to each party‘s 
ability to manage risks. Hence, there seems to be a need for a powerful and influential 
party with strong motivation to commit to PPP development. Although the GoM has been 
definite about PPP, especially PFI, the New Zealand Government (NZG) has yet to clarify 
whether it will be focusing on a particular subset of PPP. However, both governments, 
especially the GoM, appear to have accepted PPP as a rational choice for selected sectors 
in consideration of their countries‘ developments.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
12 However, there is a limit to how far the private sector can get involved in public services delivery as some 
countries are more conservative with their frontline services.     
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3. Features of PPPs 
 
The reasons for PPP have been presented and justified. Since there are reasons warranting 
the need for PPPs, countries will need to prepare a framework to guide PPP development. 
The framework should include features that will maximize the success and minimize risks 
of failure. Consistent with the rational choice theory, the features of a PPP are expected to 
contribute to its delivering an optimal outcome after evaluating the circumstances of each 
country.  
 
Apart from the rational choice theory, transaction cost economics (TCE) predicts that 
different contractual problems generate different transactions. Consequently, each country 
is expected to have a different PPP framework because of their respective circumstances. 
Aubert and Weber (2001) presented an overview of the transaction cost theory based on 
Oliver Williamson‘s work. They mentioned Williamson‘s assumptions which are bounded 
rationality (humans are unlikely to have the abilities or resources to consider every state-
contingent outcome associated with a transaction that might arise) and opportunism (humans 
will act to further their own self-interests). This is applicable to PPPs, where both partners 
cannot perfectly predict the future of their long term partnership and each has their own 
interests to pursue. This aspect of risk is further analysed in chapter 4. 
 
Accompanying these assumptions are three variables affecting a transaction: namely frequency, 
uncertainty and asset specificity (Transaction Cost Economics, n.d., p. 2).  Aubert and Weber 
(2001, p. 5) explain that uncertainty exacerbates the problems that arise because of bounded 
rationality and opportunism. Uncertainty in a PPP occurs due to the long term arrangement 
between the participants. In addition, these uncertainties give rise to costs. They note that 
transaction costs arise for ex ante reasons (drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding agreements 
between the parties to a transaction) and ex post reasons (maladaption, haggling, 
establishment, operational, and bonding costs). Each partner will try to minimize these costs 
from a PPP but each will also seek to reduce uncertainty. Consequently, similar to an organic 
structure13, the arrangement of a PPP should allow for changes via renegotiation during the 
course of the project.  
 
                                               
13 An organic structure emphasizes participation and fits an environment with high uncertainty, high market 
participation, high technological change, long-term time orientation, and with employees who preferred 
autonomy and had high tolerance for ambiguity. 
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It was noted above that Hammami, et al. (2006) found that PPP projects thrive where there 
are large markets and high demand for infrastructure. Aubert and Weber (2001, p. 5) note 
that, with rational choice theory, the opposite of a large market also raises concern. Small 
numbers trading is concerning because if only a small number of players exist in a market-
place, a party to a transaction may have difficulty disciplining the other parties to the 
transaction via the possibility of withdrawal and use of alternative players in the marketplace. 
In relation to PPPs, when the numbers of market participants are insufficient, the aim for 
competitiveness in a bidding process could be undermined. Since it has been presumed that 
competition will bring in the highest quality at economic prices, without enough competitors, 
the prices would not be low as they could have been for the same quality.  
 
Another aspect of PPPs also arises in TCE. This is the commitment of a non-investor to a 
transaction. Aubert and Weber (2001, p. 5) call this danger asset specificity, the value of an 
asset may be attached to a particular transaction that it supports. The party who has invested 
in the asset will incur a loss if the party who has not invested withdraws from the transaction. 
Consistently, these reasons are highly regarded in a PPP. Each potential partner arguably 
has their own method for handling every detail of each transaction with varying cost-
minimizing approaches. They then added that decision-makers must weigh up the production 
and transaction costs associated with executing a transaction within their firms (insourcing) 
versus the production and transaction costs associated with executing the transaction in the 
market (outsourcing).  
 
Hence, a PPP framework should be structured in ways that regard the TCE issues including 
bounded rationality, opportunism, uncertainty, the number of market participants and asset 
specificity. Jefferies (2006, p. 453-454) presented a list of success factors that would be 
beneficial for this purpose. For an example, bounded rationality issues would require expertise 
and transparency to maximize fore-knowledge. Opportunism could be minimized with shared 
authority, appropriate risk allocation and a good partnership culture to refrain unnecessary 
opportunistic behaviours. The issues with frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity could be 
dealt with by political stability and support, a comprehensive feasibility study, technical 
innovation, and a strong private consortium.  
 
These requirements exist in New Zealand and Malaysia to a certain degree. However, the 
deciding factor will be on the ability to identify and apply these factors rationally 
according to the changing environment. This is especially so when the circumstances of 
both countries are affected by external factors such as global recessions or natural disasters. 
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For a PPP to succeed, both government and private sectors will need to work together to 
avoid substandard works. There should be an acceptance of the limits of both partners thus 
allowing them to react optimally and practically based on the information that they have 
gathered for PPP development. Also, the success factors of PPPs may vary across countries 
and thus the variation should be rationally incorporated in developing PPPs. This chapter is 
intended to introduce and evaluate the features of PPP as outlined by the PPP authority in 
both countries. As mentioned before, a well developed PPP framework should include 
features that would maximize success and minimize risks. Consequently, this chapter also 
suggests that the features of PPPs are influenced by rational choice theory and TCE. 
 
 
3.1. Features of PPP - New Zealand 
 
A PPP authority should be present in PPP-adopting countries to take charge of PPP 
development. For this, the National Infrastructure Unit (henceforth NIU) of the Treasury is 
responsible for PPPs in New Zealand. It specializes in PPPs and provides economic 
evaluation, financial assessment, and advice on all PPPs. However, the NIU will not 
contract for projects itself due to its budget constriction, so PPP contracts will be entered 
into by line agencies. These departments and agencies are expected to consult the NIU 
early in the development of a PPP proposal, and to allow the NIU to include an 
experienced officer in the project steering and working groups (NIU, 2009, p. 3). The 
presence of an NIU officer in every PPP project is intended to ensure the optimal choice is 
chosen at each PPP stage. Also, Cabinet approval is needed for in-principle funding and to 
invite expressions of interest (EoI) (NIU, 2009, p. 5). Other major stages in developing 
PPPs (NIU, 2009, p. 5) are shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 Major stages in a PPP development 
 
Stages Key Tasks and Issues 
The Service Needed  Identify service needs 
 Focus on outcome and outputs 
 Consider broad needs, over time 
 Allow scope for innovation 
Procurement 
Options 
 Public provision or contract out? 
 Are there ‗specific assets‘? 
 Conventional procurement or PPP? 
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 Allow scope for innovation  
Business Case 
(Stage 1) 
 Evaluate benefits, risks and costs of preferred option 
against other options, including status quo 
 Evaluate procurement options 
 Obtain funding and project appraisal  
 Begin development of PSC14 
Project 
Development  
 Assemble project team 
 Develop project plan 
 Further develop the PSC 
 Develop commercial principles 
 Consultation  
 Develop invitation for EoI15 and evaluation criteria  
Business Case 
(Stage 2) 
 Seek approval to issue the EoI 
 Obtain delegated authority to commit  
Bidding Process  Evaluate responses and develop a shortlist 
 Develop RFP16 and contract 
 Seek approval to issue the Project Brief 
 Evaluate bids 
Project Finalization 
Review  
Final Renegotiation  
 Confirm achievement of policy intent 
 Probity review 
 Report to ministers 
 Execute contract 
Contract 
Management  
 Formalize management responsibilities 
 Monitor contract performance 
 Manage variations  
 
These major stages seek to deal with bounded rationality, opportunism, frequency and 
asset specificity. The earlier stages seek to ensure that a PPP project is rational while 
taking into account other possibilities and other potential issues. The middle stages are 
dedicated to creating a plan to maximize success and the last stages are about earning 
political support for the management of the PPP project. It is crucial that a PPP project is 
justified as necessitated and approved by the Cabinet because a PPP failure can be very 
costly. Political support is required for PPPs especially at the early stage of PPP 
                                               
14 Public Sector Comparator  
15 Expression of Interest 
16 Request for Proposal 
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implementations which will inevitably involve high costs along with high possibility of 
failures. As proven by the UK and Australia, where there is a political will, there is a way. 
Since the ultimate accountability lies with the government, the NZG will need to be well 
informed and be aware of the consequences of pursuing a PPP.  
 
3.1.1. Procurement options  
 
In preparing for these stages, issues to be considered include reputational risk, financial 
impact, accounting treatment and appropriation, and public sector comparator (PSC) (NIU, 
2009, p. 13-14). Additionally, to pursue a PPP, the procurement decision framework 
(shown in Figure 6) would be helpful (NIU, 2009, p. 7): 
 
Figure 6 The procurement decision framework 
 
                
                        Characteristics 
Procurement type 
New 
service 
Specified 
outputs/ 
outcomes 
Specific 
assets 
Durable 
service  
Public provision 
 
        
Short term service contracts 
(up to 10 years) 
        
Let separate construction and 
service delivery contracts 
        
Long term contracts (PPPs) 
 
        
 
This framework provides the characteristics or the requirements for a PPP project approval. 
In selecting projects to be delivered via a PPP, New Zealand requires the project to deliver 
a new service with specified outputs/outcomes for a specific asset that is capable of long 
term services. This is because a PPP is not suitable for all projects. Thus, the framework 
gives some idea about the type of projects that could yield positive results if delivered via a 
PPP and when other arrangements might be more appropriate. Also, a preference for a PPP 
must be preceded by evaluation of the following (NIU, 2009, p. 9-11):  
1. whole of life cost17  minimization; 
2. financing cost optimization; 
                                               
17 The total costs of owning an asset for its whole life. 
P a g e  | ２８ 
 
3. greater cost certainty; 
4. maximization of user benefits; 
5. high bidding and contracting costs; 
6. high cost of contract variations; and 
7. difficulty of contract enforcement. 
 
The evaluation of these factors enables the identification and minimization of total costs 
without distorting quality. Identifying and valuing costs for a long term PPP involve 
uncertainties that lead to insecurities to both partners. Hence, a PPP contract includes 
actions to be taken by both partners in unforeseen events. These can be difficult to enforce 
as each contract is based on a case-by-case foundation.  This is especially so for major and 
costly projects. These stages and a framework are meant to identify as many issues as 
possible so that the best method to deliver infrastructure is chosen. This is because entering 
into a PPP arrangement involves significant costs and a long term commitment. 
 
3.1.2. Project development and business case 
 
A public sector comparator (PSC) is commonly used to determine whether a project would 
be better off with or without a PPP. New Zealand‘s PSC consists of (NIU, 2009, p. 15): 
1. construction and operating costs of a project;  
2. provision for competitive neutrality adjustments to remove any advantages or 
disadvantages that accrue to a public sector procurer by virtue of its public 
ownership; and  
3. provision for any additional costs and risks that would be transferred to the private 
sector partner under a PPP. 
 
These factors are added as costs to the PSC because the public sector partner would have to 
bear the costs of any risks that occur under conventional procurement (NIU, 2009, p. 15). 
A discount rate is applied to value the project at its present value and included in the PSC. 
The PSC provides valuable information for identifying and costing all project risks as 
decisions are made based on available information, and bids are evaluated against a 
common benchmark (NIU, 2009, p. 15). This thesis does not cover PSC in great detail but 
future research is expected to present a better understanding of the preparation and the 
foundation of assumptions which is expected to vary across countries in designing PSC.  
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For a PPP, the NIU requires engagement of advisors
18
 to add value to PPP projects, 
commercial principles, and market sounding (NIU, 2009, p. 16-21). These include 
allocating risks wisely, maximizing innovation, ensuring that the contractors and SPV have 
sufficient capital and capability to deliver, sharing excess profit/revenue between partners, 
avoiding tax exploitation, and minimizing subsequent negotiations. The NIU also 
emphasizes that payments commence after the service is available and the amount payable 
will be proportionate to the delivered quality and quantity of units. The intention here is to 
ensure service delivery as contracted. In consideration of the long term agreement, the NIU 
adds that payment mechanisms would be flexible to accommodate future requirements 
without negotiating a separate arrangement (NIU, 2009, p. 16-21). The NIU then discusses 
market sounding as a consultation to fairly include the private sector, key advisers, 
associations, or specific companies for key issues like the availability of industrial skills or 
a forum organization for interested parties to provide public input (NIU, 2009, p. 21). The 
willingness to allow for inputs from affected parties is commendable as this effort 
welcomes involvements from interested parties. Beneficially, pertinent issues could be 
discussed from both sides as the NIU focuses on minimizing the risks of PPP failures by 
emphasizing precautions that both partners should be aware of as made apparent under the 
commercial principles.  
 
3.1.3. Bidding process through to contract 
 
Bidding process
19
 is another stage that requires special attention because bounded 
rationality starts here. This stage needs as much information as possible to assist judgement, 
but it is impossible to be informed of everything. Since it is the first stage involving a 
potential private sector partner, a proper appraisal is expected as failure to rationally 
choose a partner at the very beginning could have a pessimistic snowball effect. Hence, the 
potential partner‘s level of market interest, financial capacity, technical capability, 
understanding of government requirements, resources to deliver the project, and market 
soundings will be studied. Furthermore, entities with an equity stake in a bidding 
consortium should be independent of the parties that have equity stakes in other consortia 
to avoid conflict of interest. As for the project finalization review and final negotiation, 
negotiations can be minimized or avoided if potential bidders are allowed to comment on 
the draft contract before the issuance of a Project Brief. This encourages all proposed 
                                               
18 Refer to http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/PPP_TTF_Technote3.pdf for details. 
19 It includes EoI, request for proposals (RFP), and bid evaluation (NIU, 2009, p. 23-24). 
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changes to the contract to be accompanied by a dollar adjustment to the bid price that 
would leave the bidder indifferent between having the amendment and not having it (NIU, 
2009, p. 25). Consequently, the government could then decide on changes without further 
negotiation (NIU, 2009, p. 25). Also, a good contract management establishes better 
performance monitoring against KPIs, payment approvals and contract variation dealings 
(NIU, 2009, p. 26) (these are discussed in chapter 5). The NZG should also be protected 
from legal risk and re-transfer of risk back to the NZG in drawing up the contract (NIU, 
2009, p. 26). This stage welcomes the potential private sector partners to contribute from 
the early stage thus informing the NZG of their actual capabilities and at the same time 
allowing the NZG to react optimally and protect itself against avoidable and unnecessary 
risks. 
 
The described stages for PPP development may be seen as the resulting outcome in 
rationally considering PPPs for quality infrastructure. Complementary to the presented 
stages is a Gateway Review Process for quality assurance of large or high risk state sector 
projects. This review process requires six separate reviews by independent experts whose 
reviews will be confidential to all except for the project‘s senior responsible official (NIU, 
2009, p. 3). Having reviews from independent experts will further inform any decision 
made for or against PPPs which could weaken any intervention from personally interested 
individuals (opportunism), thus allowing better judgment to either accept or reject a PPP.  
 
3.1.4. Summary of PPP process 
 
Fundamentally, there are three stages to using New Zealand public funds (OAG, 2008a, p. 
11). The first is the availability of different funding options and their respective 
significance i.e. make or buy. Secondly, the need for a specific strategy for appropriate 
guidance and management. Thirdly, rationalization for the funding, the type of relationship 
involved, and the form of funding arrangement that will best fit with the goal and 
relationship. These stages ensure that the allotted funding will be wisely used and geared 
towards the public‘s satisfaction. Although a normal PPP requires the private sector partner 
to fund the project entirely or partly, it is common for the public sector partner to prepare 
financially for the possibility that it might need to take over the project if its partners fail to 
fulfil their contracts. The main concern in using public funds is VFM
20
 attainability as it 
aims for the best possible outcome without wasting resources, by considering the total 
                                               
20 Value for money 
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costs of ownership or whole-of-life cost, benefits of the arrangement, and contribution to 
the desired outcomes (OAG, 2008b, p. 6). A competitive tender for merely the lowest price 
does not guarantee VFM because the most appropriate procurement method for the risk 
and value of the procurement may not be the cheapest (OAG, 2008b, p. 6) as it depends on 
the ability of the partners to utilize available resources wisely. Hence, the need for a well 
developed procurement framework that could maximize VFM achievability by assigning 
responsibilities to each partner‘s capabilities.  
 
Prior to New Zealand‘s PPP Guideline, only the NZLTMA 2003 was relevant for a PPP 
(Owles, 2008). It specifies that a PPP agreement must contribute to economic development, 
ensure safety, personal and public security, environmental sustainability, complement 
existing transport strategies and recognize available alternatives, as well as taking into 
consideration public consultation (Owles, 2008; NZG, p. 74). These considerations signify 
that a PPP should be arranged in ways that are relevant to New Zealand‘s environment. 
Additionally, NZLTMA 2003 also prohibits a concession agreement (CA) from providing 
a disincentive for the alternatives, such as deterring a relevant authority from procuring 
rival infrastructure or a disincentive for a person to pursue other sustainable transport 
options e.g. public transport (NZG, p. 74). Accordingly, a CA‘s terms and conditions must 
include those approved by the Minister and be consistent with NZLTMA and other 
relevant enactments (NZG, p. 77).  
 
Also, a CA must not exceed 35 years, but a subsequent extension is allowed for up to 10 
additional years. This extension is available for a CA that has been operating for more than 
two-thirds of its term. The extension will be granted if applied prior to agreement cessation 
and there are exceptional circumstances requiring the extension (NZG, p. 74). The same 
rule applies to leasing of associated land
21
 which will be 35 years maximum with a 
maximum 10 years extension (NZG, p. 79). This period is inclusive of construction and 
operation. It is expected that this period is sufficient for the private sector partner to 
complete the construction and make it operational, whilst allowing them to recover their 
costs. The NZG has made it clear that the land and road in a PPP agreement will be 
publicly owned and leases of the land will be contract-restricted (Owles, 2008). This 
means that the private sector partner will not have direct rights to the land or the road. 
Additionally, only with the Minister‘s prior written approval can a public road controlling 
                                               
21 Land includes an estate, right, title, or interest in land; and a road or portion of a road; and land acquired by 
the road controlling authority under the Public Works Act 1981 (NZG, p. 79). 
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authority proceed with a CA. The approval will be granted if the Minister is satisfied with 
preset conditions that protect public access to the associated new road, conditions that 
relate to the apportionment of risk, responsibilities and rights between parties, civil 
penalties specification for breach of conditions and disputes-resolving procedures (NZG, p. 
74). Hence, it is important to ascertain that the Minister is informed of any conditions that 
could affect the approval.  
 
In a media statement, NZCID
22
 (2009) announced that the NZLTMA 2003 is long overdue 
for a review. The Act was intended to improve the flexibility of land transport funding, 
including provisions enabling new roads to be built on a tolled or concession basis. 
However, it contains barriers to using tolling, borrowing and PPPs to fund transport 
projects due to the complexity in its administration which requires repetitive consultation 
and approval processes which resulted in the absence of PPP concessions with only one 
completed public toll road (NZCID, 2009). The NZG appears extremely careful when it 
comes to roading projects via a PPP. Due to the nature of a PPP which requires 
collaboration between the private sector and public sector partners, there will always be the 
concern that the partnership might be undermined by profit motivation of the private 
entities when it comes to tolling. Hence the rigorous tests to make sure that a PPP is 
essential for a roading project as witnessed in the Waterview project.  
 
It has been reported that apart from roading and water projects, the private sector appears 
interested in PPPs (OAG, 2006, p. 20). As noted by Hammami et al. (2006), PPPs work 
best with many private entities in a large market that creates sufficient competition to 
achieve high quality at lower prices. Arguably, New Zealand may not have the size or the 
number to attract enough interest from domestic or international companies. Plus, there are 
constraints and substantive limits on partnering arrangements concerning water and 
wastewater services
23
 and prisons management
24
 (OAG, 2006, p. 21) which limit PPP 
development in New Zealand. However, the OAG (OAG, 2006, p. 20) seems optimistic 
                                               
22 NZCID stands for New Zealand Council for Infrastructure Development.  
23 A local authority or council-controlled organization cannot use assets of its water services as security, and 
cannot vest ownership in, or lose control of water services assets. Contracts and partnerships are permitted 
for any aspect of the operation of a water service, for a term of up to 15 years, but the local authority must 
keep control of all matters relating to pricing, managing, and setting policy on the delivery of water services.  
24 The Corrections Act 2004 prohibits the Crown from entering into any contract to manage any prison. Even 
if the ongoing service provision aspect of a partnering arrangement were for other services, the Crown‘s 
retention of control over management may make this difficult in practice. 
 
P a g e  | ３３ 
 
that with time
25
 New Zealand will be better prepared for PPPs. After conducting research
26
 
to assess private sector interest in PPPs, the OAG recommends that New Zealand could 
either co-operate with Australian governments to establish one Australia/New Zealand 
market for PPPs, or bundle small contracts into a larger package to make them more 
commercially attractive, or create small-scale versions of PPPs (OAG, 2006, p. 20). These 
options accentuate the need for a larger market before PPPs become viable in New Zealand. 
There is some doubt whether a small-scale version of PPPs would work. This is because a 
PPP is commonly used for large projects requiring high skills and high costs as practised in 
the United Kingdom, since a PPP has higher success rates with complex and costly 
projects. This raises some doubts of whether a PPP would be a rational choice for New 
Zealand. Further, it has been suggested that the general public may not give consent to 
these options, seeing the high likelihood that the people of New Zealand value 
independence and least costly method of procurement without much reliance on the private 
sector as contested by the Auckland Regional Council officers (Dearnaley, 2008). 
 
 
3.2. Features of PPP - Malaysia 
 
A PPP Unit is the centre of reference for privatization and PPP programs. It is established 
to foster strategic partnerships with the private sector in delivering privatization and PPP 
programs, and to operate in a transparent manner to achieve recognition for Malaysia‘s 
innovation, leadership and expertise in implementing privatization and PPP programs (3PU, 
2010). Since the unit is still relatively new, there might be a lot to learn about PPPs from 
other countries with PPP experiences while taking into consideration Malaysia‘s 
circumstances. Its existence should allow an on-going evaluation on PPPs and their 
progressions. Other central agencies such as the Ministry of Finance, the Attorney 
General‘s Department, the Ministry of Public Works, the Valuation Department, the 
Federal Department of Lands and Mines and the relevant client agencies will play 
supporting roles (Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2010, 2006, pp. 232). These agencies will be 
                                               
25 Time will be needed in New Zealand to build a local market with clients, contractors, and 
financiers who are experienced in the use of partnering, especially arrangements that have the 
characteristics of PPPs. Establishing a market for long-term partnering arrangements, especially 
those that involve private financing, needs significant involvement from experienced companies, 
which are likely to be based overseas. However, the international partnering market is competitive, 
and international bidders and funders will invest their time and money in New Zealand only if they 
have the confidence that there is a real opportunity. 
26 Despite security of private sector partners‘ investments, it is quite unlikely that the general public would 
give consent to these options, seeing the high likelihood that the people of New Zealand value independence 
and least costly method of procurement without much reliance on the private sector. 
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helpful in making informed decisions as they are specialized departments. The 
involvement of other agencies (similarly to New Zealand) hints that the PPP unit cannot 
exist on its own and this encourages more communications between each agency, allowing 
for better informational flow. These agencies should consider the environment needed for a 
successful PPP and the need to educate the public sector about PPP concepts to rationally 
justify and encourage PPPs.  
 
In Malaysia, a PPP is structured to warrant commitment, better control, management and 
project supervision (3PU, 2009, p. 9). Figure 7 shows the way this should work: 
 
Figure 7 The structure of a typical PPP in Malaysia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    
 
Figure 7 shows the main players in a typical PPP and their responsibilities; customer, 
operation or finance. The roles played by those mentioned above are explained below (3PU, 
2009, p. 10): 
a) Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV):  
1. raising the funds to develop and maintain the assets;  
2. making payments to the subcontractors, financiers and other creditors;  
3. delivering the agreed services to the public sector according to the levels, 
quality and timeliness of the service provision throughout the contract period;  
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4. ensuring the assets are well maintained and available for use throughout the 
concession period; and  
5. ensuring that revertible assets/facilities are transferred to the public sector in the 
specified conditions at the end of the concession period.  
b) Financiers:  
1. the financing of the project is provided by a combination of equity investors and 
debt providers.  
c) Construction Contractors:  
1. to carry out construction works according to the contract with the SPV  
d) Facilities Management Operator:  
1. to carry out comprehensive facilities management of the assets according to the 
contract with the SPV.  
e) The Public Sector is responsible for:  
1. identifying, assessing and prioritizing projects for implementation via PPP;  
2. preparing and managing the projects for competitive bidding process;  
3. providing clear objectives and scoping of the projects, output specifications, 
payment mechanism and KPIs;  
4. ensuring equitable and optimal allocation of risks;  
5. contract management and performance monitoring; and  
6. safeguarding public interests.  
 
This structure provides the basic PPP arrangement but the details will be dependent on 
projects and industries. Knowing the main players along with their respective roles and 
responsibilities assist with PPP management, and also educates the general public about 
PPPs, its players and what can be expected from them.  
 
Drawing on rational choice theory, value for money (VFM) is the most attractive reason to 
opt for PPP. It reconciles the procurer‘s need for quality and provider‘s desire for profit 
and also fits with rational choice theory. To take on a PPP project, VFM must be 
achievable, as evaluated against PSC. This means that the cost of capital expenditure and 
the maintenance of the project through its whole life (prior to transfer to the Government) 
must be lower than the determined PSC (Jayaseelan & Tan, 2006, pp. 97). Although PSC 
can be imprecise due to the underlying assumptions and subjectivity of, for example, the 
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discount rates, it estimates the amount that the government would have had to spend had it 
taken on the projects alone. When PSC is indeterminable due to lack of government 
expertise or experience, consultants independent of the bidding private companies will be 
hired for PSC estimation to ensure fair tender giving processes (Jayaseelan & Tan, 2006, 
pp. 97). Otherwise, the Public Works Department will assist in PSC preparation for 
standard construction projects (Jayaseelan & Tan, 2006, pp. 97). The GoM reckons that 
VFM needs efficient allocation of risks, whole life service approach, private sector 
innovation and management skills, synergies from inter-linking the design, finance, 
construction and operations. These are weaved into some of the key features/characteristics 
of PPP (3PU, 2009, p. 5-6): 
1. relationship between public and private sectors is based on partnership; 
2. public sector procures specified outputs or outcomes of a service for a concession 
period; 
3. private sector determines the required inputs to achieve the specified output and it 
may introduce innovation into their designs and development to reduce overall 
costs; 
4. payment for services is based on pre-determined standards and performance; 
5. promotes ‗maintenance culture‘ where the concessionaires will be responsible for 
the long term maintenance of the assets throughout the contracted operational 
tenure; 
6. integration of design, construction, finance, maintenance and operation – total 
package; 
7. transfer of assets at the end of the concession period is optional for the 
Government; 
8. optimal sharing of risks whereby risk is allocated to the party who is best able to 
manage it; and 
9. Whole Life Cycle Costing (WLCC); PPP projects are usually awarded based on 
lowest total cost over the concession period compared to lowest construction costs 
under the traditional procurement method. 
These characteristics show the need for the procurer to get the best out of its partners 
without constricting their process so that PPPs will not only be a rational choice for the 
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procurer, but also the partners. Pursuing VFM allows for optimal allocation of risks 
between the public and private sector, the long term nature of contracts and WLCC, output 
specification which allows bidders to innovate, competition that provides fair value costing 
of the project, performance-based payment mechanisms, and private sector management 
expertise and skills (3PU, 2009, p. 6). Indeed, VFM achievability is one of the main 
considerations in opting for a PPP. If it is deemed unlikely to achieve VFM, going for a 
PPP will be meaningless and unlikely to succeed. This is why GoM requires bidders with 
high technical merit and capabilities with emphasis on VFM
27
 and affordability
28
 (Ahmad 
Badawi, 2009, p. 2). In addition to these characteristics, the GoM requires the PFI pre-
requisites already noted (Ahmad Badawi, 2009, pp. 2-3): a centralized unit within the 
public sector to supervise and monitor PFI and emphasizes the contract monitoring process 
during the operational phase especially on the availability and performance regime. This 
requires the public sector to have a comprehensive understanding of a long term service 
delivery model based on a PFI framework defining relevant objectives, procedures and 
policies and a transparent and equitable PFI processes to ensure that the desired results are 
achievable. In order to do this, the government needs a strong drive to introduce new 
changes for taxpayers and to continue to commit to the PFI to ensure its success. 
 
These prerequisites ensure that both partners are well prepared for PPPs. Otherwise the 
consequences could be severe. Hence, the GoM will be playing an active role in a PPP by 
monitoring the project closely and ensuring that there is an indisputable need for a PPP. 
Since a PPP failure could cost a lot, a government has to be committed and optimistically 
able to learn from its mistake to improve its PPP framework. 
 
Malaysia has experienced DBFO (Design, Build, Finance, Operate), BOO (Build, Own, 
Operate), BOOST (Build, Own, Operate, Subsidise, Transfer) and BOL (Build, Operate, 
Lease) (Ismail & Md. Yusof, 2009b, p. 76) and has benefited from them. Particularly, the 
GoM has a special interest in PFIs. This is because PFI arrangements maximize quality by 
requiring facilities maintenance, output specifications and clearly stipulated key 
performance indicators (KPIs) for regular performance evaluation and audit of the 
privatized entities to ensure standards and KPIs are satisfied (Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-
                                               
27 The optimal combination of whole life cost and quality to meet the users‘ requirements. 
28 Dictates the limit that the public sector is willing to pay for the procurement and the price proposed by 
each bidder must be within the budget of the public sector. 
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2010, 2006, pp. 229). These requirements oblige both partners to be aware of their 
project‘s progression in order to detect and react to emerging crises immediately.  
The Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2010 (2006, pp. 225) reveals that most of the road projects 
in Malaysia utilized build-operate-transfer (BOT) method which holds the private sector 
responsible for, among others, construction, operation, maintenance and funding of the 
facility. In return, depending on the contract, the private sector may collect tolls from road 
users during the concession period. At the end of the contracted period, the facilities are 
transferred to the Government at zero cost
29
 (Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2010, 2006, pp. 
225). As straightforward as it sounds, there have been circumstances in which road users 
had to bear increasing toll rates and a prolonged tolling period, to cover road maintenance 
costs mostly due to road accidents. These circumstances normally call for contract 
renegotiation. There is a standard format for privatization agreement in which 
renegotiation is made with mutual consents to improve terms and conditions, to address 
revenue sharing with the GoM after an agreed threshold is reached, to adjust performance-
based tariff, to abolish exclusivity in the service provision, and to improve quality and 
service standards (Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2010, 2006, pp. 226). This is an example of 
the need to factor in the presence of long term uncertainties requiring renegotiation as 
shown in TCE. As the GoM might need to consider the reputation and longevity of its 
partners, the private sector partners might need to make changes according to the ruling 
political party following five-yearly elections.  
 
Similar to New Zealand requiring ministerial consent, proposed PPP projects must satisfy 
ministries‘ statement of needs and government priorities (Economic Planning Unit, 2009b, 
p. 8). Accompanying this, a project will be chosen after considering socio-economic 
impacts, VFM and cost savings to the GoM, quick project delivery and service 
enhancement, increased level of accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, and the need 
for a PPP (3PU, 2009, p. 5). A completed PPP proposal should go directly to the relevant 
ministries or agencies detailing required information (see appendix A) such as a business 
plan and a financial plan (3PU, 2009, p. 7-8). The proposed project will be filtered based 
on clearly identified and quantified output specification. The economic life of the asset or 
service should be at least 20 years. Projects with technological obsolescence risk will be 
discarded, and the project sponsor must be financially secured with a paid up capital of the 
SPV to be at least 10% of the project value (3PU, 2009, p. 8). These and more are specified 
                                               
29 Jalan Kuching, Jalan Pahang and Jalan Cheras toll roads were transferred to the Government and the toll 
charges eradicated (Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2010, 2006, pp. 226) 
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in Garis Panduan Kerjasama Awam Swasta
30
 (Public Private Partnership Guideline). It 
describes the PPP framework, payment principles, project valuation criteria, project 
execution structure, processing procedure and execution, and project proposal preparation 
guideline (Economic Planning Unit, 2009b, p. 6). The publication of the guideline marks 
PPPs as a beneficial procurement method in Malaysia. This has  affected the 10
th
 Malaysia 
Plan as growth of public investment would be reduced to 0.7 per cent per year and the 
investment will be specified for certain projects; poverty eradication, personnel 
development, and improvement of social and physical infrastructure (Economic Planning 
Unit, 2009a, p. 5). As noted, PPPs allow for reduction in public investment as some of the 
funding will be borne by the private sector partners. This permits the GoM to smooth cash 
flows thus improving the level of national debt.  
To support PPP/PFI growth in Malaysia, the GoM uses the Employees Provident Fund 
(EPF), a state-run pension scheme. Because of EPF, some authors regarded Malaysia‘s PFI 
deviates somewhat from the ideal PFI principle (Jayaseelan & Tan, 2006, pp. 96). 
Conflicting interest might be another issue to be considered with this arrangement which 
could question any objectivity in choosing which public department and which projects to 
pursue a PPP. According to Takim et al.‘s research (2008, pp. 75), the majority of the 
public respondents (97 per cent) strongly disagree to using EPF as the source of finance in 
delivering Malaysian public infrastructure. The respondents believe that the government 
does not have to invest through its government linked companies and be exposed to risks 
unnecessarily. In contrast, the majority of the private sector respondents believe that EPF 
has the best source of funding for a PFI project and that the investment would not bring 
losses to the EPF, instead EPF and its contributors will gain benefits and higher dividends 
(Takim et al., 2008, pp. 75). This proves that the major concern in Malaysia‘s PPPs is not 
the PPPs themselves but the participation of EPF. The EPF is deemed crucial to fund PFI 
projects in Malaysia partly because the local financing bodies are still relatively 
inexperienced and hesitant to finance the long term PFI projects (Takim et al., 2008, p. 73). 
This suggests that EPF is a temporary measure that allows the financing bodies to observe, 
learn and react according to PPP development in Malaysia. The EPF has enabled 
                                               
30
 The government announced PFI adoption would be from 2006, but the guideline was made available and 
distributed only in 2009. The delay of the guideline might cause the public to question the commitment 
issues of the government but at the same time, the public has been used to the delay in governmental services 
which makes them cynical of government decisions. There had been a number of readings that are one reason 
why it took so long for a PPP guideline. For this reason, it is expected that a number of authors will find it 
easier to criticise the guideline which appears to lack the country specific details that would make it different 
from any other existing PFI practices.  
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marginally non-viable PFI projects that could enhance future national competitiveness, 
generate new sources of growth, induce high spill over effects and create sustainable 
employment opportunities to become viable (Loong, 2009).  
 
Additionally, as shown in Figure 7 the GoM introduces a SPV called PFI Sdn Bhd
31
, a 
wholly owned subsidiary of the Ministry of Finance (MoF), with a key role in the projects 
implementation and it will be responsible for its PFI project (Jayaseelan & Tan, 2006, pp. 
96). The loan from EPF will be channelled via PFI Sdn Bhd to the builders and contractors 
(Takim et al., 2008, p. 73). PFI Sdn Bhd seems to be an intermediary between the procurer 
and the provider with an active role in ensuring PPP success as it could filter and enhance 
information. Future research should look into this arrangement more closely to better 
understand its pros and cons.  
Malaysia‘s PFI is specified for the Malaysians (Jayaseelan and Tan, 2006, pp. 96) to cater 
for nation development towards Vision 2020. Noting that PFI Sdn Bhd is a GoM-owned 
firm, it is improbable that the loans will go bad (Jayaseelan & Tan, 2006, pp. 99). The EPF 
is covered from lending exposure as it deals directly with PFI Sdn Bhd and excluded from 
bearing construction risks thus, making PFI investment a virtually risk-free investment for 
the EPF (Jayaseelan & Tan, 2006, pp. 99). Seeing that the EPF does not seem to have 
project selection expertise to make informed judgment on matters like monitoring, the role 
of EPF is limited to fund lending as PFI Sdn Bhd takes on more active roles; supervises, 
undertakes PFI programme and finances the selected contractors for PFI projects 
(Jayaseelan & Tan, 2006, pp. 99). According to an EPF representative, a PFI was 
profitable for EPF because the allocated RM20 billion under 9MP represented 6.6 per cent 
of EPF total funds, which on the money market, the EPF would earn about 4 per cent 
returns (Jayaseelan & Tan, 2006, pp. 99) but it could receive 5 to 6 per cent of the total 
profits gained from PFI investment (Takim et al., 2009, p. 105).  Also, PFI Sdn Bhd may 
opt to issue bonds with 5 per cent to 6 per cent returns to obtain funding (Jayaseelan & Tan, 
2006, pp. 99). Jayaseelan and Tan (2006, pp. 99) mentioned that the EPF has the option to 
possess some of the assets subsequent to construction and maintenance as partial 
repayment of the loan from PFI Sdn Bhd and PFI Sdn Bhd could allot the lease payments 
to the EPF. While the EPF releases some of the burden of project financing (as local 
financing bodies are reluctant and sceptical of a PPP) it creates another issue which is 
                                               
31 Sdn Bhd is abbreviated from Sendirian Berhad, indicating a private limited company in which the 
liabilities of its members are limited to the respective amount of shares that they own (Business Entities…, 
2010). 
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inconsistent with a normal PPP arrangement in which private sector partners are supposed 
to bear most or all of the project costs. The EPF provided RM20 billion for selected PFI 
under the 9MP (Jayaseelan & Tan, 2006, pp. 96). According to Jayaseelan and Tan (2006, 
p. 96) RM9.5 billion was allocated for education, RM1.6 billion for housing, RM878 
million for healthcare, and RM634 million for transport. Jayaseelan and Tan (2006, p. 96) 
added that there are other projects exclusive of the RM20 billion allocations. The 
government-initiated the Second Penang Bridge and private sector-initiated bullet train are 
examples of these other projects (Jayaseelan & Tan, 2006, pp. 96) which exemplify the 
more common form of PFI in which the private sector partner will be fully responsible for 
project funding. Therefore Figure 8 shows the difference in PPPs that are uniquely 
Malaysian.  
Figure 8 PPP in Malaysia 
 
Figure 8 suggests that the allocated RM20 billion represents the minimum investment of 
PFI in Malaysia for the 9MP period. Following the RM20 billion fund, the GoM 
encourages the PFI-interested private entities to bid for the limited funding assistance. The 
conditions are (Abdul Razak, 2009, March 10): 
1. The private sector will implement, finance and assume project risks. The project‘s 
revenue must be generated principally from the private sector, and not from 
Government sources; 
2. Government financial assistance will only constitute a small proportion of the 
project investment cost to enable a marginally non-viable project to become viable; 
and 
3. Projects to be implemented must be in strategic sectors, such as education, health 
and tourism; have high spill over effects; create sustainable job opportunities; and 
enhance the nation‘s competitiveness. 
PPP in Malaysia 
Government initiated 
 
Private sector initiated 
Within EPF RM20 billion scope Outside EPF RM20 billion scope 
      (Source: Takim, Ismail, Nawawi & Jaafar, 2009, p. 105) 
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Although the fund would encourage private sector entities to participate in PFI projects, it 
also worries many who believe that it will undermine PFI, regardless of the amount 
allotted to facilitate PFI. They argue that funding should come from the private sector 
partners, just as the name suggests, private finance initiatives. Although the GoM believes 
that the project would be promising, it needs to be attentive of a self-fulfilling prophecy 
among the general public which could devastate efforts for PFI. The criticisms on the PFI 
facilitation fund will be further discussed later.  
 
A periodic payment, also known as the Unitary Charge (UC) is another important PPP 
feature. Most PPP arrangements are expected to have this feature included as it motivates 
the private sector partners to perform as specified. The GoM clarifies it as (Ahmad Badawi, 
2009, p. 1): 
1. made up of capital and service payments; 
2. payable when the asset becomes functional until the contract end; and  
3. deductible based on the formula in the contractual payment mechanism with failure 
to deliver specified output and performance as contracted).  
 
Ahmad Badawi (2009, p. 2) further explained that the contract price (both capital and 
service elements) is fixed, which can benefit the government because the private sector 
will have to bear any variation to the construction and maintenance costs. If any cost 
variation did occur, to an extent that could affect performance based payments, the private 
sector partner might adversely react to the effect. This possibility warrants for a transparent 
government and reputable private sector partners for a successful PPP.  
 
Figure 9 summarizes PPP project selection (3PU, 2009, p. 11): 
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Figure 9 The process flow of a PPP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3. Summary 
 
So far, in both countries, it is apparent that pursuing PPPs involve long and meticulous 
stages intended to ensure a PPP is necessary in light of rationality and transaction costs. 
The striking difference in PPP features in both countries is the project finance aid for PFI 
in Malaysia. This practice differentiates Malaysia‘s PFI from other PFI versions and from 
the lack of public discussion in New Zealand about financing options. Malaysia‘s 
financing arrangements are different from other countries where most PPPs are successful 
partly because the private sector partner is solely responsible for project finance to 
motivate it to perform well. However, it has been made clear that the Malaysian finance 
market is sceptical of PPPs, justifying the need for financial aid. In this way, Malaysia has 
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found a way to get around the small market that has so far contributed to the restriction on 
PPPs in New Zealand. However, it requires the government to inject public funding into 
the PFIs which reduces the benefits of the private partnership. Both countries justify the 
need for PPP in delivering any projects that the governments could not deliver without 
involving the private sector while attracting potential partners from the private sector.  
 
Apart from the features, the success of a PPP is also dependent on the allocation of risks. 
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4. Risk allocation 
 
Risk allocation is an important feature in a PPP because it affects VFM and accounting for 
PPP. While chapter 3 introduced features that shape PPP framework, chapter 4 presents the 
risks that could inhibit the success of a PPP. 
 
Risks are defined as any factor, event or influence that threatens the successful completion 
of a project in terms of time, costs or quality (Medda, 2007, p. 214). Medda (2007, p. 214) 
provides examples of the main risks affecting a PPP in transportation which are technical, 
commercial, political and regulatory, and economic and financial risks
32
.  In a PPP, risks 
are not only identified but also shared between partners based on the knowledge that 
organizations have different problem-solving abilities. Poor allocation of risks will 
negatively affect the progression of a PPP. Hence, a designated risk bearer must be the 
entity best able to influence and control the outcome cost-effectively (Medda, 2007, p. 
214). A PPP in Papua New Guinea is an example (Asian Development Bank, 2008, p. 2): 
 
…a BOT [build-operate-transfer] contract for the supply of electricity was structured 
without considering potential currency risks. Thus, when the national currency 
devalued against the US dollar, the spread between the cost of purchasing power 
from the BOT partner (in US dollar) and the revenue from consumer payments (in 
local currency) widened substantially to the detriment of the public sector purchaser.  
 
Even if all risks are considered, allocation of risk has not always been appropriate, and the 
government has had to assume risks that were initially transferred to the private party 
(Webb & Pulle, 2002). This is as happened to the Sydney airport rail link, which the NSW 
Government took over after the company that built and operated the link failed to meet 
scheduled payments to creditors (Webb & Pulle, 2002). Transaction cost economics (TCE) 
may suggest that these risks arise from uncertainty due to bounded rationality and 
                                               
32
 Medda (2007, p. 214) explains the following as the main risks in a PPP transport: 
1. technical risks: risks in construction;  
2. commercial risks: uncertainty in marketplace; 
3. political and regulatory risks: government actions affecting private sector 
profitability; and  
4. economic and financial risks: uncertainties concerning economic growth, inflation 
rates, convertibility of currencies, and exchange rates. 
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opportunism. Detailed research on the impact of TCE on failed PPPs might be able to 
provide deeper insights into how exactly TCE and failed PPPs are related as well as how 
successful PPPs strive against the problems brought up by TCE. This is beyond the scope 
of this thesis, but research into the relationship between TCE and PPPs could identify 
critical factors that inhibit PPP successes.  
 
The contingency theory could also explain the issues of allocation of risks from theoretical 
angle. It identifies specific aspects associated with certain defined circumstances and 
demonstrates an appropriate matching (Otley, 1980, p. 413). This match is known as fit and 
according to Betts (n.d., p. 123) the better the fit the higher the performance which 
indicates a match between the characteristics of the environment and those of the 
organization. In a PPP, these characteristics are taken into consideration and matched to 
the best partner for a fitting allocation of risk. Each identified risk is matched to most 
fitting partners for better PPP progression.  
 
Further, the theory identifies that there is no one best way to organize and any way of 
organizing is not equally effective (Betts, n.d., pp. 123). Since different environments lead 
to different internal and external constraints to be considered in each setting, it is 
comprehensible that each PPP agreement will have different contractual terms depending 
on the nature of the asset or service.  
 
The theory also distinguishes mechanistic (a stable environment and routine technology) 
from organic (an unstable or turbulent environment and changing technology) forms of 
organization and management (Betts, n.d., p. 124). Donaldson (2001, p. 47 & p. 58) added 
that a mechanistic structure emphasizes hierarchy and fits an environment with low 
uncertainty, low rate of market, low technological change, short-term orientation, and  with 
employees who were comfortable being controlled, liked to work with others, and had low 
tolerance for ambiguity. He then explains that organic structures emphasize participation 
and fit an environment with high uncertainty, high rate of market, high technological 
change, long-term time orientation, and with employees who prefer autonomy and have 
high tolerance for ambiguity. This way the organization and its personnel can better 
respond to the constantly changing technology. Deductively, a PPP arrangement should be 
of organic forms to cater for the possibility of renegotiation arising from uncertainties that 
are unavoidable with long term contracting. 
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Donaldson (2001, p. 58) further adds that a major source of task uncertainty is innovation, 
much of which comes ultimately from the environment of the organization, such as 
technological and market change. Innovation as a major source of task uncertainty may be 
applicable to a PPP as one reason for PPPs (as noted in Chapters 1 and 3) is the way that 
private partners can innovate. For this chapter, the highest performance would refer to 
strategic risk allocation that minimizes the magnitude of each allocated risks so that 
rational choice theory prevails. This thesis does not go deeper into this issue, but research 
into PPP from the viewpoint of contingency theory could contribute to knowledge about 
PPP development.  
 
In relation to risk factors, Ng and Loosemore (2007, p. 70) believe that risks should also be 
given to those who want and can take on the risks. The risk-taker could charge a premium 
for accepting risk. Willingness and ability to take on risks should able to minimize risk 
exposure. This relates back to both contingency theory and transaction cost theory, as an 
attempt to create a proper matching (a match between the environment and ability of the 
risk-takers and the risk itself).  
 
It is expected that there will be common risks identified across countries. However, the 
treatment of the identified risks could differ across projects and nations. Further, since 
risks are shared with the public sector, the severity of some risks may be alleviated. While 
this chapter recognises different risks to assess whether these impact the take-up of PPPs in 
New Zealand and Malaysia, future research might want to work on identifying these 
treatments of different risks across projects and nations in order to understand how PPP-
related authorities decipher the match that would work in favour of a successful PPP.  
 
Generally, there are two main groups of risks (Ng and Loosemore, 2007, p. 69). The first is 
general risks which are not directly associated with project strategies, but can affect the 
outcome. The second is project risks that originate from project management or from 
events in its immediate microenvironment. Figure 10 explains specific risks arising from a 
typical construction project according to type, source and likely bearer.  
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Figure 10 Risks identification and allocation (Source: Ng & Loosemore, 2007, p. 70) 
 
Type of risk  Source of risk Risk taken by 
1. Site risks 
Site conditions  Ground conditions, supporting 
structures 
 Construction contractor 
Site preparation  Site redemption, tenure, 
pollution/discharge, obtaining 
permits, community liaison 
 Pre-existing liability 
 Operating company/ 
project company 
 
Land use   Native title, cultural heritage  Government 
2. Technical risks  Fault in tender specifications  
 Contractor design fault 
 Government  
 Design contractor 
3. Construction risks 
Cost overrun  Inefficient work practices and 
wastage of materials 
 Changes in law, delays in approval, 
etc.  
 Construction contractor  
 
 Project 
company/investors 
Delay in 
completion 
 Lack of coordination of contractors, 
Failure to obtain standard planning 
approvals 
 Insured force majeure events  
 Construction contractor  
 
 
 Insurer 
Failure to meet 
performance 
criteria 
 Quality shortfall/defects in 
construction/commissioning tests 
failure 
 Construction 
contractor/project 
company 
4. Operating risks 
Operating cost 
overrun 
 Project company request or change 
in practice  
 Industrial relations, repairs 
occupational health and safety, 
maintenance, other costs 
 Government change to output 
specifications  
 Project company/investors  
 
 Operator  
 
 
 Government 
Delays or 
interruption in 
 Operator fault  
 Government delays in granting or 
 Operator  
 Government 
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operation renewing approvals providing 
contracted inputs 
Shortfall in 
service quality 
 Operator fault  
 Project company fault  
 Operator  
 Project 
company/investors 
5. Revenue risks 
Increase in input 
prices 
 Contractual violations by 
government-owned support network 
 Contractual violations by private 
supplier  
 Other  
 Government  
 
 Private supplier  
 
 Project company/investors 
Changes in taxes, 
tariffs  
 Fall in revenue  Project company/investors 
Output demand   Decreased demand  Project company/investors 
6. Financial risks 
Interest rates   Fluctuations with insufficient 
hedging 
 Project company/ 
government 
Inflation   Payments eroded by inflation  Project company/ 
government 
Force majeure 
risk  
 Floods, earthquakes, riots, strikes  Shared 
7. Regulatory/ political risks 
Changes in law   Construction period 
 Operating period  
 Construction contractor  
 Project company, with 
government compensation 
as per contract 
Political 
interference  
 Breach/cancellation of licence 
 Expropriation  
 
 Failure to renew approvals 
discriminatory taxes, import 
restrictions 
 Government  
 Insurer, project company/ 
investor  
 Government 
8. Project 
default risks  
 Combination of risks 
 
 Equity investors followed 
by banks, bondholders and 
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 Sponsor suitability risk  
institutional lenders  
 Government 
9. Asset risks   Technical obsolescence  
 Termination 
 Residual transfer value  
 Project company 
 Project company/operator  
 Government, with 
compensation for 
maintenance obligation 
 
Although risks‘ names and the degree of focus on the risks may contractually differ, risks 
in a PPP project are expected to not be that different from any other construction project 
except for the possible alleviation of some risks‘ severity caused by having a public sector 
procurer as a partner. In particular, Grimsey and Lewis specifically pointed that there are 
six areas of risks associated with PPPs (Ng and Loosemore, 2007, p. 70): 
1. public risk: government‘s duty to ensure successful delivery of facilities; 
2. asset risk: assets are of shorter lives than anticipated, maintenance costs are more 
than anticipated, assets damaged or destroyed by a force majeure event, etc; 
3. operating risk: purchased services not delivered as agreed in terms of specification, 
costs or timing; 
4. sponsor risk: a SPV is unable to meet its contractual obligations and the 
government is unable to enforce them or recover compensation; 
5. financial risk: prices and costs increases, financiers withdrawing, interest rates 
increasing or from poorly designed financial structures; and 
6. default risk: unable to perform contractual obligations on time or to defined 
standards. 
 
These six risks will be compared to risks identified in New Zealand and Malaysia. The 
main problem in allocating risks lies in allocating the risks to the right partner and ensuring 
that the risks transferred are truly transferred. Allocating these risks to the partner that can 
handle them cost- and time-effectively may seem straightforward. However, identifying, 
classifying and allocating risks are not simple tasks as these tasks involve uncertainties and 
judgments which result could be either desirable or disastrous giving rise to risk disputes. 
Hence, disputing over risk allocation is not unprecedented. For this matter, Medda (2007, p. 
215) suggested arbitration, mediation, mini-trial, private judging, neutral expert fact 
finding, and final offer arbitration as optional in resolving disputes to avoid court litigation 
and contracts renegotiation. Medda (2007, p. 217) looked at risk allocation using the final 
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offer arbitration game and found that a settlement rather than an arbitration agreement may 
reduce the effects of potential moral hazard problems where guarantees have higher value 
than the financial loss related to the risk covered by the guarantees. This means that a 
chosen dispute resolution must also take into account potential moral hazard problems to 
ensure the right partner is bearing the right risks.  
 
Also, it is important to minimize errors in allocating risks. This is because effective risk 
allocation will have positive effects on VFM achievement (English, 2005, p. 93). Also, 
allocation of risks will influence economic ownership of the asset which depends on who 
bears the risks and benefits of ownership (English, 2005, p. 103). This will in turn affect 
off-balance sheet accounting treatment which will only be available to the public sector 
partner if the economic ownership of the asset lies with the private sector partner. The 
failed Latrobe Regional Hospital PPP in Australia provides empirical evidence and insights 
into the difficulties facing PPP partners in identifying and allocating risk in PPP 
arrangements (English, 2005, p. 111). According to English (2005, p. 109), Latrobe 
Regional Hospital‘s failure was induced by unreasonable assumptions about government 
subsidies and costs; misunderstanding of the hospital casemix-funding model and its 
impact on future levels of funding; and an assumption by the PPP operator of the 
government‘s willingness to renegotiate the contract (English, 2005, p. 109). In this 
example, the operator was not only unable to make a profit from contracted payment levels 
for the delivery of the services (English, 2005, p. 109), but also misunderstood the 
casemix-funding model, and expected renegotiation, which the government declined 
(English, 2005, p. 112). In this particular example, both parties are responsible for the 
failure. Risk was inappropriately borne. Government accepted the lowest bid without 
considering sponsor risk or political risk and appeared to expect the private sector to 
deliver identical services more efficiently than it could. English (2005, p. 112) suggests 
this may have clouded government‘s judgement. This demonstrates the importance of 
meticulously identifying and allocating risks to the right partner, but also of the delicate 
balance that his requires. The lack of a ‗crystal ball‘ (i.e. bounded rationality and 
uncertainty) to see all future risks is also an issue. 
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4.1. Risk allocation - New Zealand 
 
The OAG (2006, p. 8) also emphasizes identifying and allocating risks wisely for VFM 
achievability. Despite the problem of bounded rationality, risks should be well identified to 
ensure that vital risks are dealt with. The Waterview Connection
33
 steering group identified 
and reported the following risks (Report of the Waterview Connection Steering Group, 
2008, p. 25):  
 
Figure 11 Risks as identified by the Steering Group 
Risk category Description 
1. Site risk Risks such as the availability of the site and planning and 
consenting risks. 
2. Design, 
construction and 
commissioning 
risks 
Risks such as ensuring the design is fit for purpose, 
unforeseen ground conditions, and construction cost 
escalation. 
3. Operating risks Risks such as higher than expected operating costs, the risk 
that refinancing increases or decreases the cost of 
borrowing. 
4. Demand risk The risk that traffic demand is more or less than anticipated. 
5. Market risks Risks such as market competition, availability of finance and 
inflation. 
6. Policy change risk The risk of general policy changes that affect the 
profitability of the PPP as well as specific changes that have 
a material adverse effect on the private sector partner. 
7. Force majeure risk Inclusive of uninsurable risks such as war and terrorism. 
Public sector partners are responsible for risks that are required by legislation to remain 
with the public sector partner and also the risks that they directly control. These risks are 
inclusive of (Report of the Waterview Connection Steering Group, 2008, p. 25):  
1. Obtaining a designation and resource consents; 
2. The development and approval of any tolling scheme; 
                                               
33 For details on Waterview Connection , refer to http://www.nzta.govt.nz/projects/waterviewconnection . 
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3. Land purchase; and 
4. Discriminatory law change directed specifically at the PPP 
Another risk that a government should be careful of is reputational risk and this risk relates 
to project commitment. Although the government can withdraw before contract sign up, 
withdrawal for reasons other than VFM could harm New Zealand‘s and the NZG‘s 
reputation as this could reduce the number of bidders and the costs of the project in 
subsequent attempts to pursue a PPP (NIU, 2009, p. 13-14). This could mean that the 
quality of infrastructure built may suffer since the competition between fewer bidders may 
not be able to pressure competitors with high expertise to bid on higher quality 
construction and maintenance. Consequently, PSC might show that a project would be 
better off without a PPP.  
 
Comparing this list to the previous six identified risks associated with PPPs, it seems 
apparent that there are key risks for a PPP that are missing, namely public risk, asset risk, 
sponsor risk, financial risk and default risk. As shown in the previous examples, these risks 
are essential and should be identified and allocated appropriately so that the responsible 
partner would be able to react to risk exposure. However, the Report of the Waterview 
Connection Steering Group has identified other risks that are not listed in the essential six 
risks for a PPP. This either shows that the missing risks are incorporated into the additional 
risks or the missing risks are deemed less important than the missing risks. Had there been 
a misjudgement in identifying risks, this could have a detrimental affect on the PPP 
success.  
 
New Zealand has already identified risks that should be borne by the public sector partner. 
Some risks must stay with the public sector either because they fall within the public sector 
partner‘s responsibility or because it has been constituted that way to protect public interest. 
Similar to English (2005), these include the need for government to deliver public services 
even when the private operator fails. As for the other risks, they are normally transferred 
wholly or partly to the private sector partner. Since the practice of risk allocation is 
susceptible to its environment, such as the type of project, the procurer‘s background and 
resources availability, there might be practices in which both partners share a particularly 
challenging risk either equitably or as deemed appropriate. Hence, the risk sharing practice 
in New Zealand is unclear due to a lack of projects, future research might want to analyse 
future projects and risk development.  
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Risk also affects finance. Fletcher
34
 however, questioned whether private sector funding 
would be viable in the current credit environment without government guarantees, whilst 
realizing that guarantees would nullify the transfer of risk to the private sector (Gibson, 
2008). This occurred in Australia (English 2005) and Gibson (2008) calls PPP risk transfer 
illusory
35
.  The Press (2008) reported that if a PPP project did not provide revenues for the 
private sector partners, taxpayers will have to bail them out which means that financial risk 
eventually stays with the taxpayers even though the risk should have been transferred to 
the private sector partners. Following this, chief executive of Fletcher Building‘s 
infrastructure division, Mark Binns suggested that if the transfer of risk was incomplete, 
arguably, the Government would be better off raising debt, potentially through 
infrastructure bonds, using other traditional procurement methods (Gibson, 2008).  
Incomplete risks transfer might be the reason for illusory benefits of risks transfers. The 
practice of identifying and allocating risks is not immune to human errors because there are 
judgements involved. Hence, the chosen method to identify and allocate risks should 
support complete and effective risk transfer but the involvement of public goods does 
make this difficult. 
 
 
4.2. Risk allocation – Malaysia  
 
A PPP generally transfers from the government to the private sector partner(s) the 
responsibility to finance and manage a package of capital investment and services 
including the construction, management, maintenance, refurbishment and replacement of 
public sector assets such as buildings, infrastructure, equipment and other facilities, which 
creates a standalone business (3PU, 2009, p. 4). The transfer of these risks to the private 
sector indicates the perception that the private sector partners are better than their counter-
partner at handling and managing the risks at the least costs. Had the public sector assumed 
the responsibility for these risks, it is assumed that the end result would be substandard, 
thus the time and public fund spent would have been wasted. As warned before, this 
perception should not cloud rational and cautious judgement in managing risks.  
 
                                               
34 The Fletcher Construction Company is a general contractor in New Zealand and the South Pacific 
[www.fletcherconstrucion.co.nz]. 
  
35 The British Government‘s bailout of Metronet, the private operator of the London Underground (Gibson, 
2008) 
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Norton Rose (2006, p. 4) conducted research in Asia and presented the following risks: 
 
Figure 12 Risks as identified by Norton Rose 
 
Risk categories Description 
Supply risk Certainty of supply of goods and materials. Quality of supply, 
ease of importation of goods, transparent tax regime. 
Demand risk Demand for infrastructure linked to payment 
Is patronage a major risk? 
Completion risk Ability to reach financial close and ability to satisfy conditions 
precedent including land acquisition, construction and 
commissioning the project on time and on budget. 
Operational risk Skill and experience of operator. Quality of supply of spare 
parts and materials, energy supply and labour. 
Environmental risk Compliance with environmental law: comprehensive impact 
studies and viable means of mitigating contamination. 
Engineering risk Complexity of the project and availability of skilled labour, 
contractors and professionals. Largely mitigated by expertise 
but can be affected by ground condition, flooding, seismic 
activity etc. 
Political risk Political violence/terrorism, risk of expropriation and currency 
convertibility. 
Counterparty risk Quality of counterparties, governments or other ‗offtakers‘ 
(credit risk assessment). Reliability of contractors and 
government licence/permitting departments. 
Legal and 
regulatory risk 
Sanctity of contracts, legal transparency, lack of corruption, 
clear regulation and enforcement of laws. 
Foreign exchange 
risk 
Restrictions on currency exchange, currency exchange 
fluctuations, currency remittance laws/restrictions on 
borrowing, depth of swap markets. 
 
From these identified risks, the report shows that (Norton Rose, 2006, p. 8): 
1. Demand risk is the main concern of respondents across countries and sectors; 
2. Demand risk should be allocated to governments; 
3. Too many projects across the region either do not meet the transport needs of the 
public thus under-utilized or cost too much to be of practical use; 
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4. Governments will need to subsidize many projects to alleviate demand risk 
concerns and public funds will need to be well allocated; and  
5. Sponsors could be induced to deliver future costs savings through the use of PPP 
output specifications and payment mechanisms which Asian governments have not 
yet embraced.  
 
Norton Rose explained that demand and completion are reported as the biggest concerns 
because most of the respondents were bankers who cared more for projects‘ vulnerability 
to bad economics and delay (Norton Rose, 2006, p. 11). The report also mentioned that the 
rationale behind the completion risk being one of the biggest concerns is postponement of 
delivery of land or permits by the government (Norton Rose, 2006, p. 11). It might be fair 
to state that, from the standpoint of the loan providers, the demand and completion risk are 
the most important as there are cases of incomplete projects resulting in huge financial loss. 
The survey suggested that funding availability requires mitigation of demand and 
completion risks, and the sponsors to be connected with reliable counterparties 
(government and contractors), especially in countries with liquid domestic financing like 
China, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore (Norton Rose, 2006, p. 11).  
 
In comparing the mentioned risks with the six risks earlier, other than operating risk, the 
remaining five risks are missing. Similar to New Zealand, only operating risks are properly 
identified. However, as mentioned before, the missing risks could have simply been named 
differently or merged or separated into different risks, such as financial risks in comparison 
to foreign exchange risks and sponsor risk in comparison to counterparty risk.  
 
With regards to the financing through the EPF fund aid, in which GoM through EPF 
granted RM20 billion to PFI Sdn Bhd for 2006-2010, Gunasegaram (2006, pp. 100) argued 
that PFI Sdn Bhd and EPF are exposing GoM directly to construction risk, resulting in a 
contingent liability of up to RM20 billion. This is worrying because this implies that the 
construction and investment risk will basically remain with the government via PFI Sdn 
Bhd and not be transferred to the private contractors (Netto, 2006). Due to the future 
uncertainties and the possibility of massive compensation by the GoM to exit PFI if needed, 
Gunasegaram deemed it a misnomer to name such an arrangement a PFI (Gunasegaram, 
2006, pp. 100). This concern is not only applicable to EPF‘s PPPs but also non-EPF‘s PPPs. 
Considering PPP projects are selected projects that are deemed important for nation 
development, it is highly likely that the government will have to step in if the projects 
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showed any signs of failure. Because of this possibility, choosing the right partners is vital 
because risk is not transferred.  
 
According to Kiggundu, PPP is still unutilized in developing public transport in Kuala 
Lumpur. Considering that the normal practice in Kuala Lumpur is to transfer investment 
risk to the private sector, transferring the whole financing risk to the private sector partner 
is argued as reckless because most transport infrastructure projects are capital-intensive 
and fare revenues are rarely high enough for the private partner to achieve break-even. 
Because of this, Kuala Lumpur state has been separately financing and implementing its 
own public transport projects and programs except for some toll expressway projects for 
which the Federal Government has paid compensation and provided profit protection 
schemes for concessionaires (Kiggundu, 2009, p. 292-293). Macroeconomic stability such 
as inflation, foreign exchange, currency depreciation and fiscal policy can only be handled 
by the government as it formulates and implements policies (Kiggundu, 2009, p. 283). The 
partnerships between the private sector and the government are expected to solve the 
financing and investment risks associated with private concession agreement as 
experienced by Kuala Lumpur, Manila and Bangkok (Kiggundu, 2009, p. 283) but not a 
number of other risks listed in Figure 12. If the partnership manages to identify and 
allocate risks strategically, the partnership could (Kiggundu, 2009, p. 292-293): 
1. maximize the efficiency of the private sector in supplying public transport services 
in Kuala Lumpur;  
2. assist policy makers to mitigate both commercial and non-commercial risks 
associated with the implementation of transport infrastructure projects; 
3. make the public sector responsible for the relocation of the displaced people by the 
projects, land acquisition matters, the provision of soft loans especially to private 
bus companies and the provision of tax reductions and exemptions for public 
transport firms; and 
4. require the State to subsidize interest payments of the loans secured by the public 
transport operators to build the new infrastructure. 
So, the partnership will not only be responsible for the project development, but also other 
people affected by the project development. This concept is similar to corporate social 
responsibility and having a public official on board might be able to give a better sense 
relief to the people affected by the projects.  
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4.3. Summary  
Another look at the presented risks in New Zealand and Malaysia shows that there are 
common risks across countries, although some may have been named differently. What 
makes them really different is the degree of regard that they have over particular risks as 
well as the partner assigned to effectively manage the allocated risks. These lists (Figure 
10, Figure 11 and Figure 12) themselves represent the PPP environment and hindrances 
that could ultimately challenge PPP success.  
Figure 13 Comparing risks identified in New Zealand and Malaysia  
New Zealand’s Risks  Malaysia’s Risks 
1. Site risk  1. Demand risk  
2. Design, construction and 
commissioning risks 
 2. Counterparty risk 
3. Operating risk  3. Completion risk 
4. Demand risk  4. Supply risk 
5. Market risk  5. Environmental risk 
6. Policy change risk  6. Political risk 
7. Force majeure risk  7. Operational risk 
  8. Legal and regulatory risk 
  9. Engineering risk 
  10. Foreign exchange risk 
 
Comparing the two countries‘ risks and PPP‘s six areas of risks, there does not appear to 
be outstanding differences between them, other than different classifications, potentially 
suggesting differences in focus for each risk. This is as explained before by contingency 
theory that any way of organizing is not equally effective. Although different environments 
identified similar risks, these risks are not treated equally across country. As seen from the 
two lists, Malaysia identified more risks than New Zealand‘s. This could be indicative of 
experience or seriousness in pursuing a PPP. An alternative but less likely explanation is 
that the Malaysian environment has naturally more risks that could harm a PPP compared 
to New Zealand‘s. Other potential factors contributing to unequal treatment could be 
P a g e  | ５９ 
 
government current policies, local and international financial market, general demand and 
political situation of respective country.  
Claims of illusory risk transfer challenge the notion of real transfer of risks. According to 
Takim et al. (2009, p. 105), there is limited real risk transfer to the private sector since both 
counter parties to the contract are government entities which operate the project financing 
scheme. This refers to PPP projects where funding is aided by the EPF. However, there are 
other PPP projects that are not EPF-related. Plus, transferring risks require the ability to 
identify and quantify the risks monetarily to verify any effect from transferring risks. 
Otherwise, the perception of bogus risk transfer would lead to a self fulfilling theory 
among the general public that could hinder the government from pursuing PPPs. It is fair to 
expect standardization of similar risks in PPP countries after which comparison could have 
been possible across PPP countries to pinpoint the best practice of risk allocation. It may 
also be fair to add that the practice of sharing a particular risk between both sectors 
proportionately might emerge, although currently such a practice is still absent to protect 
the governments from all risks. However, the private sector could benefit from such a 
practice so that it will not have to expose itself to risks that it could limitedly take on. 
Acceptability of risks by the public sector depends on legislation and the public‘s approval. 
Thus, it has been highly advisable to utilize PPPs with the public‘s consent for better 
chances of success.  
 
It is recognized however that total risk transfer will not occur when the asset or service is a 
public good, as government will be expected to deliver it. Thus public risk cannot be 
transferred. Further, the Malaysian government acts as financier and therefore takes on 
more risks than New Zealand seems prepared to take on. The EPF fund aid also reduces 
risk transfer in these PFI arrangements.  
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5. Performance indicators 
 
Operators are compensated or rewarded based on performance. Therefore, indicators are 
needed to evaluate a project‘s progression and to work out compensations in a PPP project. 
This chapter will look at how performances are evaluated in New Zealand and Malaysia. 
Performance indicators and the required performance level are dependent on the project 
type (e.g. BOOT). Projects being delivered on time or earlier and within budget have been 
mainly used to indicate that the projects are doing well. However, the public is also curious 
about the progress of PPPs other than the physical development of contracted infrastructure, 
such as the contents of the contract agreement, the on-going number of users, and financial 
reports on each project especially when the public needs to pay for the infrastructure either 
directly or through taxes. This information may be restricted by commercial confidentiality 
of the private sector partner, or when the cost of publicizing the information outweighs any 
potential benefits. In response to this issue, a performance benchmark is set to mark project 
progression and/or success.  
 
A typical PPP contract normally includes target benchmarks as key performance indicators 
(KPIs) in terms of acceptable ranges of performance rather than single-point measures of 
performance (OECD, 2008, p. 80). This is expected to sufficiently induce the private sector 
partners to perform well without de-motivating them. Additionally, specified performance 
levels should be output-specified rather than input-specified for innovation and optimal 
risk transfer. In the absence of appropriate comparators or benchmarks, an appointed 
government authority and the bidders will create a performance regime during the 
competitive stages of the procurement (HM Treasury, 2007, p. 69). This will allow them to 
devise reasonable
36
 and objectively measurable performance levels. As examples, the UK 
and Australia employ efficiency measures (defined in terms of inputs and outputs), 
effectiveness measures (in terms of outcomes), service quality measures, financial 
performance measures, as well as process and activity measures (OECD, 2008, p. 81). Also, 
                                               
36 A reasonable level is as decided by the Authority (HM Treasury, 2007, p. 69): 
1. What the optimum 100% performance standard would be and whether it is achievable and essential 
(taking into account the nature of the Service), to set the required standard in the Contract at this level.  
2. In some cases like operating theatres in hospitals and custody suites in police stations, the optimum; 
100% standard is required and should be achievable. In other cases the Authority may recognize that the 
optimum 100% standard is neither always essential nor achievable. In such cases, the Authority may 
retain the optimum 100% level, but allow a certain leeway before the Contractor suffers for performing 
below such 100% level. For example, it may be acceptable for the Contractor to incur a certain number 
of performance points in any specified period before suffering financially where the Service provided is 
adequate without being excellent and the under-performance does not materially affect the operation in 
that area. 
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principal contractors and other private sector partners must submit their financial 
documents to the government
37
 so that the financial performance of the concessionaire can 
be closely monitored by the government (OECD, 2008, p. 81). After concluding a PPP 
contract, the government assesses whether the contractor is actually delivering the 
contracted VFM and whether the financial and non-financial investment benefits of the 
project are delivered (OECD, 2008, p. 80). From these, it can be said that a PPP is 
constantly monitored and evaluated throughout its contacted period to minimize 
probability of project failure. Also the on-going evaluation allows both partners to be 
vigilant and responsive to matters that could adversely affect their project.  
 
A performance benchmark for a PPP is represented by the public sector comparator (PSC) 
that measures the relative value for money (VFM) of a PPP contract (as noted previously 
in chapter 3). Performance of the PPP is monitored throughout its life and both partners 
will discuss the performance level after the PPP term has ended (OECD, 2008, p. 79-80). 
With regards to VFM, English Guthrie, Broadbent & Laughlin (2010, p. 73) suggest that 
VFM judgement must include contextually defined economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
concerns that incorporate contract fulfilment as well as current and future concerns for 
better informed decision-making. They also encourage performance audits to go beyond a 
‘watchdog’ to a ‘sheepdog’ role for more active contribution to current and future projects 
instead of letting potentially crucial information remain silent. They added that compliance 
with policy pronouncements and internal reviews are necessary but not sufficient to judge 
the economy, efficiency and effectiveness in a performance audit of the mature operational 
stage of private provision of public services (English et al., 2010, p. 73). Hence, 
information gathered from compliance and reviews must be evaluated critically to identify 
relevant and reliable past events for future references.  
 
 
5.1. Performance indicators - New Zealand  
 
The Office of the Auditor General in New Zealand noted that performance measures and 
standards should be quantitative and qualitative (OAG, 2006, p. 43). Relying only on 
quantitative performance measurements could heighten the absence of key qualitative areas 
which can be catastrophic as happened with the Deer Park Women‘s Prison in Victoria. 
The prison is a failed build-own-operate project which performance measures were largely 
                                               
37 However, contracts in Victoria normally exclude financial performance measures  (OECD, 2008, p. 81) 
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quantitative. Thus there was too much focus on short-term achievements when the project 
is meant for a long term (OAG, 2006, p. 43). Hence in choosing KPIs, quantitative and 
qualitative measures should be employed in ways that objectively support a project‘s on-
going evaluation. Performance measures and KPIs generally include safety, quality, 
customer service and/or incidents/accidents as well as price, asset management and asset 
development (Waterview Connection Steering Group, 2008, p. 20). Performance 
management is crucial and accordingly it should be part of the initial decision-making 
process in choosing the procurement method because performance monitoring systems 
should include responsibility specification and mechanisms to identify and manage poor 
performance (OAG, 2006, p, 67).  Good performance management will positively affect 
the overall project and the operator‘s performance. Hence, the public sector partner should 
inspect its partners‘ performance reporting systems to ascertain truthful performance 
measurement and reporting, and to reassure its partners‘ financial viability (OAG, 2006, p. 
43). Because of this, a contractor must provide independent reports as assurance over the 
reliability of the provided performance information (OAG, 2006, p. 44). Since 2002, for 
Wellington City Council‘s Clear Water project which is a design-build-maintain-operate 
(DBMO) sewage treatment plant, the Council has conducted more physical inspections and 
benchmarked the performances of the UK-based contractor (Removing barriers…, n.d., p. 
3).  
 
Together with the developed KPIs, there should be specific arrangements to deal with 
substandard performance or project failure, in which case, the public sector could exercise 
rights to intervene such as default provisions and step-in rights (OAG, 2006, p. 44). These 
arrangements function as a back up plan meant to keep the project going, considering that 
most PPP projects are critical projects for the general public. However, the National Audit 
Office in the UK found that the public sector partner had not demanded all the entitled 
information, which hampered the ability of the public sector partner to monitor the 
project‘s progression thus denying external financiers the opportunity to bring private 
sector financial disciplines to the project at an early stage (OAG, 2006, p. 44). This 
indicates that proper management planning must be followed by strict enforcement for 
strategies to take effect, unless deemed otherwise. Hence, not only must each partner 
comprehend their roles, but they need to also execute them.   
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5.2. Performance indicators - Malaysia 
 
Similar to New Zealand, Malaysia also relies on KPIs. A private sector partner will receive 
sufficient lease charges as returns on investment that correspond with the level, quality and 
timeliness of service provision as assessed by designated KPIs (Ismail & Md. Yusof, 
2009b, p. 78). These KPIs must be realistic, reliable and relevant because they affect 
service payments to the private sector partner, which in turn affects motivation to perform. 
If a KPI is unrealistic, it could have adverse effects on project participants‘ morale. Ismail 
and Md. Yusof (2009b, p. 78) mentioned that the difference between the concessions of the 
past and PFI is ―the implementation process, not on the conceptual and philosophical of 
PFI‖. Whilst the past had been consumed by process, a PFI is output-driven, with more 
flexibility for the private sector partner to innovate in the process. Since KPIs allow both 
partners to reflect on the past, a chosen set of KPIs should be able to provide information 
that can assist present decision-making for future achievement. Accordingly, Ismail and 
Md. Yusof (2009a, p. 11) proposed the following (as shown in Figure 14) as Malaysia‘s 
Construction Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for public infrastructure: 
P a g e  | ６４ 
 
 
 
Figure 14 Malaysia's Construction KPIs
Deliberative Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 
Functional Operational Professional 
Environment  Economic  Social  
Construction  
Pre-construction  
Initiation 
Planning 
Designing 
Tendering  
Post-construction 
Commissioning  
Operation 
Maintenance   
Consultant  
Civil & 
Structural 
engineer 
Mechanical &  
Electrical 
engineer 
Product  
Environmental    
   impact 
Water quality 
Water    
   production 
Energy  
   consumption 
Water  
   consumption  
Whole life  
   impact 
Transportation  
   movement 
Water reduction 
Gas emission 
Habitat created 
Habitat retained 
Biodiversity 
impact  
 
Customer product  
   satisfaction 
Defect 
Total construction  
   cost 
Productivity 
Time  
   predictability 
Profitability 
Safety 
Cost predictability 
Total construction  
   time 
 
Community 
End 
user 
Member of   
the public  
Employment 
Product  
   satisfaction 
Health & safety  
   awareness 
VFM 
Service satisfaction 
Quality satisfaction 
Overall satisfaction 
Inquiry satisfaction 
Delivery reliability 
Advice satisfaction 
Investor in people 
Punctuality 
Employee‘s  
   attitude  
Employer Employee  
Employee & 
Employer satisfaction 
Training 
Equality/diversity 
Working environment 
Investor in people 
Occupational Health &  
   Safety  
Health & safety  
   awareness 
Qualification/skill 
Employer & 
Employee turnover 
Working hour 
Pay 
Management influence 
Reward 
Sickness/absence  
Architect 
Surveyor 
Consultant  
Manufacturer  
Supplier  
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The KPIs suggested in Figure 14 are grouped into functional, operational and professional 
sources, each with their own sub-divisions, intending to include as much area as possible. 
Ismail and Md. Yusof (2009a, p. 8) explained that these are organized and characterized 
through careful and systematic discussion to allow for economic and social structure 
enhancement from the public infrastructure procurement approaches. They added that for 
greater public participation, public criticisms about PPPs are included in its formulation 
due to the significance of public needs and requirement. Participation of the curious 
general public is essential because as the end users, in some PPPs they are the source of 
revenue for the concessions, thus their willingness to pay for the services is partly a 
deciding factor on whether a PPP is a success or a failure. Based on the resulting KPIs, if 
the result is unfavourable, the GoM will not hesitate to penalize the responsible partners 
(Ismail & Md. Yusof, 2009a, p. 9). Even so, it should be remembered that KPIs are mere 
indicators of the past. Hence they should be referred to as on-going guidance instead of the 
ultimate goal.  
 
The following represent the advantages of KPIs (Ismail & Md. Yusof, 2009a, p. 6-7): 
1. benchmarks the organization performance against other industry or organization for 
targeted improvement; 
2. highlights weaknesses; 
3. alerts the directors and lower personnel; 
4. focuses improvement efforts on critical issues;  
5. encourages the industry players to utilize best practice and to maximize 
communication while avoiding the burden of brainstorming a list of good KPIs; 
6. links employee rewards and sanctions to performance measured against the 
standard established to motivate individual performance;  
7. improves the ongoing performances of the entire organization and project as KPIs 
score the performance, detect changed conditions, recognize potential problems and 
designate a change from preliminary strategy of particular project or organization; 
and  
8. offers many perspectives on a single event where KPIs endorse intense focus and 
scrutiny, and compel improvement within the project or organization.  
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It is noted that these benefits are achieved with good KPIs. Otherwise, KPIs could lose 
some of their merits by missing out on the most important data for a particular project 
progression. Hence, KPIs must be developed in ways that will be most beneficial and 
relevant for both partners and other KPI users. Figure 15 shows the characteristics required 
of a good KPI (Ismail & Md. Yusof, 2009a, p. 8): 
 
Figure 15 Characteristics of MC KPIs 
 
Characteristics  MC KPIs 
1. Consistently self-developed and timely available data  
2. Continuously quantifiable and flexible valid data  
3. Easily understood data  
4. Closely-monitor performance in reaching objectives   
5. Reflect and quantify intentional value drivers  
6. Value drivers establishment by member of the public  
7. Implemented throughout the project/business  
8. Graphically and visually illustrated e.g. chart  
9. Expression in number or non-number or both  
10. Distinguishable interpretation by different parties χ 
11. Corporate standard measurement establishment   
12. Link with reward and penalty system  
13. Improve performance and quality  
14. All-in-one perspectives on a single event   
Source: Ismail & Md. Yusof (2009a, p. 9)  
 
These characteristics represent information that KPI users deemed as important and crucial 
to a PPP project development. 
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5.3. Summary   
 
Whilst the NZG emphasizes the whole performance management (including KPIs) 
throughout a PPP, Malaysia seems to be more concerned about the KPIs themselves. This 
shows that New Zealand has the capacity to discipline its private sector partner whilst 
Malaysia is more concerned about the data themselves. This is because privatization has 
different effects on both countries. As it has been boosting Malaysia‘s development, for 
New Zealand, it has induced prudence and a reticence in having private sector in public 
services
38
.  
 
In performance measures that have been assessed, specific mention of economy, efficiency 
and effectiveness concerns are lacking. These areas were previously proposed by English 
et al. (2010) and it is surprising that they are not evident in either Malaysia or New Zealand. 
However, they could have been embedded in the KPIs. Since details on KPIs do not seem 
to be publicly available (potentially to protect a project from unwanted speculation) it is 
unclear as to whether these countries have similar or different appetite for PPP‘s KPIs. 
Thus, although each project‘s performances are well recorded or analysed, comparison 
with other projects locally and internationally can hardly be made. Without this 
comparison, it could not be determined if issues that emerged throughout project 
progressions were also affecting other local and/or international PPPs.  
 
It has been made apparent by both countries, however, that KPIs are valued as performance 
indicators and performance motivators. This is because KPIs direct the partners to the 
problematic areas allowing them to alert the responsible partner which later allows them to 
identify the issues/factors giving rise to the problems. This will then allow them to revise 
whether the risks were allocated correctly. Future research should consider looking into 
KPI selection process and the consequences of the selection in order to better understand 
KPIs practicality as well as to enable comparison of best practice and similarity of 
standardized KPIs.  
 
 
 
                                               
38 With the National Party’s decision not to move any state-owned enterprises to the private sector in its first 
term if elected this year, we appear to have a new political consensus between the major parties in New 
Zealand: privatisation is bad. …The political aversion to privatisation is costing New Zealand potential 
gains in living standards (Kerr, 2008). 
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6. Accounting for PPPs  
 
Accounting for PPPs provides another form of performance indicator of PPPs. It identifies, 
measures, and communicates information for information users to make informed 
judgments and decisions (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002, p. 246). This chapter will present some 
of the issues relating to PPP-accounting. Naturally, accounting for PPPs should give a true 
and fair view of PPP transactions despite the uncertainty and risks from the absence of 
complete information about the past, the present and the future (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002, p. 
247). A PPP arrangement typically has two elements with discrete cash flows attached to 
each (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002, p. 259). The first is construction and provision of an asset 
and the second is provision of services. These elements entail recognition and 
measurement problems, such as the assignment of values to assets to be received in the 
future (eg 20–30 years) and whether the assets and liabilities can be measured reliably 
(Grimsey & Lewis, 2002, p. 259).  Standard setters have been working on these issues and 
more in order to provide users with transparent and reliable information. These efforts have 
led standard setters to, among others, IFRIC 12 Service Concession Arrangements and 
Exposure Draft 43 Service Concession Arrangements: Grantor.  
 
 
6.1. Accounting for PPPs by private sector partners  
 
Although not applicable to all forms of infrastructure service arrangements, IFRIC 12
39
 
was issued by the International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC) for 
the accounting by the private sector operators that provide public sector infrastructure 
assets and services in service concession arrangements (SCAs) (Deloitte, 2007). IFRIC 12 
excludes accounting by grantors and accounting for infrastructure that was recognized by 
the operator as property, plant and equipment (PPE)
40
 prior to entering a SCA. According 
to IFRIC 12, the infrastructure should not be recognized as PPE of the private sector 
operator but as either a financial asset or an intangible asset or a mixture of both 
(bifurcated model) based on the nature of the consideration given by the grantor to the 
operator (Deloitte, 2007; BDO International, 2007, p. 2). Figure 16 shows the IFRIC 12 
                                               
39 Any SCAs within the scope of IFRIC 12 are excluded from IFRIC 4 Determining whether an Arrangement 
Contains a Lease (BDO International, 2007, p. 1). 
40 The derecognition requirements of IAS 16 Property, Plant and Equipment would apply to such PPE (BDO 
International, 2007, p. 1). 
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requirements with regards to the recognition of the nature of the consideration (Deloitte, 
2007): 
 
Figure 16 Financial asset, Intangible asset, and Bifurcated model 
 
Operator’s 
rights 
Classification 
 
Unconditional, 
contractual right 
to receive cash or 
other financial 
asset from the 
grantor 
Financial asset 
Revenue and costs relating to the construction or upgrade are 
recognized in income over the construction phase of the 
arrangement in accordance with IAS 11 Construction Contracts. A 
financial asset is under IAS 39 Financial Instruments which is 
recognized and measured as a loan or receivable, or an available-
for-sale financial asset, or a financial asset at fair value through 
profit or loss, if the classification conditions are met. Monies 
received are treated as partial repayment of the financial asset.  
E.g. Operator receives a fixed amount from the grantor over term of 
arrangement, or an operator has a right to charge users over term of 
arrangement, but any shortfall will be reimbursed by the grantor 
 
Amounts to be 
received are 
contingent on the 
extent that the 
public uses the 
service 
Intangible asset
41
 
During the construction phase the operator will recognize revenue 
in respect of construction activities, with the corresponding entry 
increasing the recognized value of the intangible asset. The 
intangible asset generates additional revenue when the operator 
receives cash from users or from the grantor based on usage. The 
intangible is reduced by amortization. Thus, revenue is recognized 
twice; once on the exchange of construction services for the 
intangible asset (IAS 11 Construction Contracts), and a second time 
on receipt of payments (IAS 18 Revenue).                                     
E.g. Operator has a right to charge users over the term of the 
arrangement, or an operator has a right to charge the grantor based 
on usage of the services term of the arrangement 
 Bifurcated model 
                                               
41 The intangible asset approach is said to cause revenue ―grossing up‖ as the operator records higher total 
revenue (e.g. CU2,650) but only receives cash less than the recorded total revenue (e.g. CU1,600) over the 
term of the contract (BDO International, 2007, p. 2). 
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Consideration 
received partly in 
the a financial 
asset and form of 
partly in the form 
of an intangible 
asset 
Where the operator receives a financial asset and an intangible asset 
as consideration, they are accounted separately for the component 
parts. Initially, the assets are recognized at fair value. A financial 
asset will be recognized to the extent the operator has received a 
contractual right to receive cash from or at the direction of the 
grantor. Any excess of the construction services provided over the 
fair value of the financial asset recognized will be recognized as an 
intangible asset. E.g. an operator receives a fixed amount from the 
grantor and a right to charge users over the term of the arrangement 
 
Following IFRIC 12, New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants (NZICA) issued 
New Zealand Equivalent to IFRIC Interpretation 12 Service Concession Arrangements 
(NZ IFRIC 12) under the Financial Reporting Act 1993 effective 1 January 2008 (NZICA, 
2007, p. 1). Subsequently, Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) issued IC 
Interpretation 12 effective 1 July 2010 (MASB, 2010, p. 21). This means that private sector 
partners in New Zealand and Malaysia are currently complying with the same standard 
since there are no modifications made to the original IFRIC 12 by both NZICA and MASB. 
Uniform standards such as this will promote comparability and transparency as well as 
minimizing opportunity arbitrage or ‗venue shopping‘ between standards (Heald & 
Georgiou, 2008, p. 9). Hence, post-2010, comparisons between private sector accounting 
in New Zealand and Malaysia can be conducted more reliably based on IFRIC 12.  
 
According to Deloitte KassimChan (2009, p. 20), IFIRC 12 requires additional disclosures 
in accounting for PPPs. An operator and a grantor need to disclose classification of SCAs 
every accounting period and the operator must also disclose revenue and profits or losses 
recognized on exchanging construction services for a financial asset and/or an intangible 
asset. Prior to IFRIC 12, Malaysian service concession companies recognize profits during 
construction as incurred or as part of the initial recognition of the concession asset. Post-
IFRS convergence, the profits will be the fair value of work done and as the concession 
asset is being used, the operator‘s restoration obligation will be accrued (PwC, 2009, p. 11). 
The justification for additional disclosures would be to promote transparency by 
presentation of more precise accounts of PPP transactions. 
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6.2. Accounting for PPPs by public sector partners 
 
It is crucial that any chosen accounting rules should not deliberately favour PPPs over 
other procurements. In order to minimize the scope for accounting and budget rules to have 
an effect on the choice of the mode of a service delivery, governments should continuously 
revise their national budgeting procedures and systems to ensure a focus on affordability, 
VFM and long-term fiscal sustainability (OECD, 2008, p. 91). Otherwise, the accounting 
treatment could challenge VFM. Sue Newberry and June Pallot brought up the possibility 
of accounting related legislation manipulation to privilege PPPs in New Zealand. They 
(2003, p. 468-469) believe that New Zealand‘s Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) 1994 
privileges PPPs and promotes off-balance sheet forms of public debt which they argue help 
institutionalize fiscal irresponsibility. Off-balance sheet treatment is very tempting because 
it makes unviable projects, viable. This is because an off-balance sheet treatment allows 
payments to the private sector partners to appear as revenue charges rather than an asset 
and a liability (Grimsey & Lewis, 2002, p. 261). Consequently, the government will be 
able to deliver public infrastructure and services without having to worry about liabilities. 
However, seeing that PPP-related activity in New Zealand is limited and localized, the 
perception that the FRA 1994 is meant to privilege PPP might be an overstatement. Since 
local governments of New Zealand, such as Auckland City Council and Wellington City 
Council, are more experienced in matters relating to PPPs than the Central Government, 
this chapter will make references to local governments of New Zealand in discussing 
accounting treatment for PPPs. 
 
Due to the risks associated with PPP contracts, information relating to it should be made as 
transparent as possible without exposing the partners to unnecessary risks. The associated 
budgets and accounts must completely reveal actual and potential future payment 
obligations as well as information on how the contracts would affect cash flows, the risk of 
increased payments caused by guarantees and contingent liabilities, and whether the assets 
will be transferred to the government at the end of the contract period (OECD, 2008, p. 
101). Choosing a PPP over a traditional procurement method affects the amount and the 
timing of government expenditures as PPPs often lock in government expenditures for a 
long time. This issue is heightened by the differing adoption of accounting principles by 
governments with the choice of cash basis, modified cash basis and accrual accounting. 
Since the NZG adopts full accrual accounting based on International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), New Zealand‘s public sector accounting is expected to be transparent. 
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On the contrary, the accounts of the GoM are prepared primarily on a cash basis
42
 in 
compliance with cash basis IPSAS (International Public Sector Accounting Standards) 
which fundamentally revolves around cash receipts and payments in the current year, thus 
ignoring recognition of future transactions such as liabilities. Thus, Malaysia‘s accounts 
are lacking in transparency when compared to New Zealand‘s. It is likely that this could 
have allowed the GoM to pursue PPPs without reservation.  
 
Accounting for PPPs by public sector partners has often been perceived as lacking in 
transparency especially when off-balance sheet accounting treatment is utilized. However, 
an overview of the UK‘s Ministry of Justice Resource Accounts 2008-09 shows that PFI 
accounting by the public sector partners can be transparent, even with off-balance sheet 
accounting treatment. The PFI transactions comply with the 2008-09 Government Financial 
Reporting Manual (FReM)43 and Financial Reporting Standard 5 Reporting the Substance of 
Transactions (FRS 5) which allow for accounting of on- and off-balance sheet transactions. 
The report also utilizes the words ‗off-balance sheet PFI‘ and ‗on-balance sheet PFI‘ in the 
accounts. This makes it easier for the unsophisticated users of financial statements to detect 
PFI-related accounts. The account also specifies that: 
Residual interest in off-balance sheet PFI properties are included in tangible fixed assets 
at an amount equal to the unitary charge allocated for the acquisition of the residual 
interest to the balance sheet date. An adjustment is made based on the net present value 
of the change in the fair value of the residual interest, as estimated at the start of the 
contract and its estimated fair value at the balance sheet date (Ministry of Justice, 2009, 
p. 72).  
 
Note 28 of the report then specifies commitments under PFI contracts detailing project name, 
contract start date, duration (years), estimated capital value (£m) and description of both on- 
and off- balance sheet PFIs as well as obligations under on- and off-balance sheet PFI 
(operating leases). This is followed by Charge to the operating cost statement and future 
commitments. This resource account is prepared prior to IFRS convergence which will take 
effect in 2009-10. It will be advantageous to find out the impact of IFRS to the public sector 
accounting of the UK. Heald and Georgiou (2008) predict that the absence of public sector 
accounting for PPPs in IFRS will impose some implementation problems as PPP-accounting 
will only depend on FRS 5A to account for PPP transactions by the public sector.  
                                               
42 According to Accountant General‘s Department, modified cash basis of accounting is allowed for supplies 
and services received by 31 December that will be paid in the January of the following year via account 
payables.   
43 The FReM is issued by HM Treasury and follows UK Generally Accepted Accounting Practice for 
companies (UK GAAP) as deemed appropriate to the public sector. 
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Absence of standardized accounting treatment could tempt a government to move 
investment that would otherwise be considered public investment off the government‘s 
balance sheet, thus making it possible to avoid normal spending controls and to get around 
spending ceilings and fiscal rules (including moving expenditure to future budgets, 
increasing government liabilities and entering into guarantees to receive private financing) 
(OECD, 2008, p. 91). Ultimately, the taxpayers will have to eventually bear the risk of 
future high costs (OECD, 2008, p. 91). This then would negate rationality for choosing 
PPPs over other procurements. Noting the absence and the need for a standard, IFAC
44
 
(2008) examines the following:  
1. Terminology clarification (eg: service concession arrangements, public private 
partnerships);  
2. Adequacy of existing standards for addressing both known and anticipated service 
concession arrangements for both grantors and operators;  
3. Symmetry of accounting for both parties to a service concession arrangement;  
4. Implications for other arrangements governments may have related to the 
employment of their capital assets e.g. leasing, sale-leasebacks or other 
arrangements;  
5. Recognition of infrastructure subject to service concession arrangements; and  
6. Recognition of revenue and expenditure flowing from these arrangements. 
 
Following these, the International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) 
issued Exposure Draft 43 Service Concession Arrangements: Grantor (henceforth ED 43) 
(IPSASB, 2010). IPSASB intended for the ED 43 to mirror IFRIC 12 so that accounting by 
both partners would complement each other‘s accounts of PPP transactions. If ED 43 is 
adopted, then the off-balance sheet treatments will depend on ‗control‘ instead of ‗bearing 
the majority of risks and rewards of ownership‘ (Heald & Georgiou, 2008, p. 20). 
According to ED 43, the grantor shall recognize a service concession asset as an asset if 
(IPSASB, 2010, p. 10):  
1. The grantor controls or regulates what services the operator must provide with the 
asset, to whom it must provide them, and at what price; and  
2. The grantor controls—through ownership, beneficial entitlement or otherwise—any 
significant residual interest in the asset at the end of the term of the arrangement. 
 
                                               
44 These issues and more are addressed in the March 2008 proposal by the International Public Sector 
Accounting Standards Board entitled Accounting and Financial Reporting for Service Concession 
Arrangements is available on IFAC‘s website. 
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This means that if the public sector partner/grantor satisfies this control criterion, then the 
service concession will require an on-balance sheet treatment by the grantor. The asset will 
be recorded as an intangible asset or property, plant and equipment. The move from risks 
and rewards criterion to control criterion is led by the hunt for a more objective and 
consistent criteria to promote ‗symmetry‘ in the accounting treatment by both public and 
private sector partners (IPSASB, 2010, p. 28; Heald & Georgiou, 2008, p. 20). The risks 
and rewards criterion is deemed problematic to achieve objective assessments. Also, it 
focuses on the economic aspects of the arrangement which neglects the fact that an SCA 
primarily provides service potential on behalf of the public sector (IPSASB, 2010, p. 28). 
In contrast, the control criterion focuses on control over the service potential of the service 
concession asset and hence acknowledges an SCA‘s primary purpose (IPSASB, 2010, p. 
28). New Zealand responded well to this change and has expressed consent to using this 
control criterion in determining whether a grantor report the property underlying a SCA as 
an asset (Brady, 2008, p. 2) and thus, New Zealand has deemed ED 43 as appropriate 
(Packer, 2010). Unfortunately, Malaysia‘s stance on these matters has yet to be published, 
potentially because the GoM does not abide by accrual accounting.  
 
Under ED 43, a liability is recognized with on-balance sheet treatment and when the 
government is contracted to make service payments over the life of the contract. The 
liability is calculated from the discounted sum of the service payments. Practically, it 
represents the construction cost plus the net present value of the operating and maintenance 
costs over the life of the contract (NIU, 2009, p. 14). This liability is treated the same way 
as interest payable on government debt, as if the project was financed with Crown debt 
(NIU, 2009, p. 12). NIU‘s PPP guide specified that the accounting treatment for any 
specific proposal should be consulted with the Treasury of New Zealand (NIU, 2009, p. 
14). This means to account for a PPP project, the Treasury must be made aware of the 
project itself to provide consultation on the project. This will provide the Treasury with the 
experiences it will need to devise a robust PPP framework.  
 
Another issue lies in exclusion of PFIs from the national accounts. According to Vass and 
Donald (2010, April 18) most PFIs are excluded
45
 from the national accounts because 
according to international accounting conventions, only current debts are supposed to be 
included, not future debts. This arguably understates national debt which consequently put 
the nation in deeper debt than announced. In New Zealand, according to Newberry and 
                                               
45 The latest UK Government estimate of the deficit, excluding PFI, is pound(s)167bn, which would rise to 
pound(s)224bn if PFI was included. 
P a g e  | 75 
 
Pallot (2003), the FRA 1994 favours the private sector involvement in the provision of 
public services via accounting means by classifying future PFI-equivalent payments as not 
‗liabilities‘ but ‗commitments‘ without counting on key national economic indicators and 
target (Broadbent & Laughlin, 2003, p. 338).  
 
Note 32 Commitments of Auckland City Council‘s financial report (2009, p. 234) provides 
an example of this practice.  
 Council Group 
 
$000 
Actual 
2009 
Actual 
2008 
Actual 
2009 
Actual 
2008 
Capital commitments: 
     Right to acquire asset 
 
257 
 
2,465  
 
257 
 
2,465 
 
Considering that a liability is recognized when the government is contracted to make 
service payments over the life of the contract, the absence of liability recognition could 
indicate that the Council has no service payment obligation to Quay Park Arena 
Management Limited (QPAM), unless the liability has not been distinguished from other 
liabilities in its class. However, this example shows that commitments replaces liability as 
claimed by Newberry and Pallot. They (2003, 476) added that commitments are excluded 
from estimates of appropriations (submitted to parliament) because commitments are future 
expenses and liabilities whilst the estimates only deal with expense and expenditure 
amounts relating to the budget year (this would be of concern in a Central Government 
Department.). This treatment overlooks "contingent liabilities" which would include PFI. 
In the UK, HM Treasury responded to similar transactions (Vass and Donald, 2010, April 
18): 
HM Treasury has noted the Committee's points and has already taken a number of 
steps in these areas to improve the availability of data on PFI projects. Departments 
will publish their resource accounts on an IFRS basis in summer 2010, and these 
will reflect the PFI accounted for under IFRS. Whole of Government Accounts 
(WGA) will be published around spring 2011 and will also reflect PFI on an IFRS 
basis. Reconciliation between National Accounts debt measures and WGA on an 
IFRS basis will be provided. 
 
This shows that proper accounting of PPP is capable of telling the stories behind a PPP 
project. If the accounting treatment is ambiguous, the account could be telling a different 
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story. Additionally, governments should incorporate national procedures in the budgeting 
systems to deal with PPP contracts (OECD, 2008).  
 
There are few examples of PPPs in New Zealand from which to analyse the accounting for 
PPPs. The examples quoted so far have been from Local Government where partnerships 
have enabled assets to be built for public use. In ‗note 32‘ above and in Figure 17, the 
accounting for these PPPs is further examined. The following examples will show that 
compliance with IFRIC 12 by New Zealand‘s public sector appears consistent with ED 43. 
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The following is constructed from Auckland City Council annual reports (Auckland City Council Annual Report 2008/2009, 2009, p. 192; 
Auckland City Council Annual Report 2007/2008, 2008, p. 159; Auckland City Council Annual Report 2006/2007, 2007, p. 147) 
 
Figure 17 Right to acquire asset 
 
Note 4 Right to acquire asset Parent/Council Group 
$'000 2009 2008 2007 2006 2009 2008 2007 2006 
           
Vector Arena  
Opening balance 69,674 69,266 61,712 31,418 69,674 69,266 61,712 31,418 
Additional capital expenditure 1,711 408 7,554 30,294 1,711 408 7,554 30,294 
  71,385 69,674 69,266 61,712 71,385 69,674 69,266 61,712 
Wynyard Point public space          
Opening balance 50,841 0 0 0 50,841 0 0 0 
Capital expenditure 0 50,841 0 0 0 50,841 0 0 
Deduct capital expenditure over-
accrued -185 0 0 0 -185 
0 
0 0 
  50,656 50,841 0 0 50,656 50,841 0 0 
           
Right to acquire asset 122,041 120,515 69,266 61,712 122,041 120,515 69,266 61,712 
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The Council subsidized $68.2 million of the $80 million Vector Arena and QPAM funded 
the remaining $11 million. According to Figure 17, the right to acquire asset for the year 
2007/2008, represents the Auckland City Council‘s contribution to the Vector Arena and 
the deposits paid to acquire public space for the Wynyard Point development (Auckland 
City Council Annual Report 2007/2008, 2008, p. 159). The Council will review the 
recoverable amount of the Vector Arena annually for impairment testing. The right to 
acquire asset is explained by the Auckland City Council as the right to acquire physical 
assets owned, managed and operated by a third party (Auckland City Council Annual 
Report 2007/2008, 2008, p. 148). It is recorded as an intangible asset with the component 
relating to the residual value of the asset recorded at cost. Impairment testing allows for the 
third party requirement to maintain the asset‘s service potential and return the asset in 
identical condition (Auckland City Council Annual Report 2007/2008, 2008, p. 148). The 
component relating to the service potential to be received over the concession period is 
recorded at cost, less amortization and impairment losses until the asset reverts to 
Auckland City Council and it is amortized over its useful life and is subject to impairment 
testing (Auckland City Council Annual Report 2007/2008, 2008, p. 148). This accounting 
treatment provides an example of concession service asset being recorded in accordance to 
IPSAS 31 Intangible Asset. 
 
Another example of PPP accounting in New Zealand involves the Wellington City 
Council‘s Clearwater Sewerage Treatment Plant (Moa Point). The Council owns the plant 
and United Water International (UWI) operates it under a design, build, operate and 
transfer contract. In the Council‘s financial report, the plant and building assets are 
classified under PPE under the drainage, waste and water asset class (Note 17 of the annual 
report). As the asset owner, the Council incurs all associated operating expenses, namely 
management fees, depreciation and finance costs. In accordance with section 100 of the 
Local Government Act 2002, the Council does not fully rates fund the plant‘s depreciation 
expenditure. UWI‘s monthly management fee is determined in accordance with annually 
adjusted tariffs. However, the exact amount contributed by the plant is unknown to the 
public (Wellington City Council, 2010, p. 177). Prior to the Council‘s 2008/09 annual 
report, there is no mention of the plant or service concession arrangement in its financial 
report because NZ IFRIC 12 compliance started on 1 January 2008. This example is 
consistent with ED 43 which provides an example of recording a service concession asset 
with IPSAS 17 Property, Plant and Equipment.  
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Although not as detailed as the UK‘s, the Auckland City Council‘s financial statements 
provide accurate information on transactions involving the Vector Arena. As for 
Wellington City Council‘s reporting, although there is specific mention that the plant is 
resulted from an SCA, the exact amount contributed by the plant is unknown since it is 
included under drainage, waste and water asset class. More importantly, Packer (2010, p. 1) 
mentions that service concession arrangements have not been a feature to date of the New 
Zealand environment, despite OAG‘s report on Auckland‘s Vector Arena and Wellington‘s 
Clear Water project in 2006 and both Councils‘ reports on their SCAs. This seems to show 
the lack of interest in PPPs in New Zealand despite Packer‘s report on the growing interest 
in PPPs, although arguably Packer could be referring to the Central Government‘s SCAs. 
 
Since financial statements of QPAM and UWI are not accessible, it is not possible to 
understand how accounting treatment by both partners mirror each other. This might 
indicate the problems of limitation to information due to commercial confidentiality when 
private sector entities provide public services. Therefore, future research on the application 
of IFRIC 12 by the private sector partner and IFRIC 12‘s mirror by the public sector 
partner might be helpful in detecting any possible issues that could materialize from the 
compliance of IFRIC 12 and its mirror.  
 
Hemming (2007, p. 5) states that accounting for PPPs is further challenged by the 
ambiguous basis on which the private sector uses the asset, asymmetric government and 
private sector accounting, and inclusion of numerous imputed items in fiscal accounts. It is 
argued that (Hemming, 2007, p. 8): 
1. Classifying PPP assets as government or private sector assets does not do justice to 
the fact that PPPs are designed to share risk according to which party can manage it 
best; 
2. The fiscal costs and risks associated with PPPs, which are derived mainly from an 
obligation to make future service payments and to honour called guarantees should 
be assessed, quantified and disclosed; 
3. Either a larger flow of future public spending or a larger stock of government 
liabilities can be reported; 
4. Disclosure can substitute for or complement the financial lease/Eurostat (European 
Commission) approach; and 
5. Where PPP and/or guarantee programs are large, a comprehensive statement on 
these programs should be part of the budget documentation. 
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Hemming‘s concerns are directed at the need for fairer and more accurate reporting that 
precisely reflects the contribution of both partners in PPPs. Hence, in accounting for PPPs 
more disclosures would be favourable. No doubt these will be informative but could the 
benefits of more disclosures outweigh the costs of preparing and providing them.  
 
6.3. Summary  
 
Accounting and reporting issues of PPPs originate from the lack of information about PPP 
transactions and delimitations of PPPs. This chapter has presented examples of how 
ambiguous PPP accounting can be without proper and standardized guidance. Even the UK 
is still perfecting its PPP framework. Because of this, different countries have different 
approaches to account for PPP assets, potentially despite IFRS convergence. This warrants 
the need for additional disclosures for transparency, especially when accrual accounting is 
not implemented. The public sector procurer should hence be cautious of potential changes 
in generally accepted accounting practice when identifying information to be provided by 
private sector parties during the course of PPP arrangements. This means any changes 
affecting recognition of assets and obligatory disclosure should be disclosed appropriately.  
 
As seen from this chapter, there are a number of issues that surround accounting of PPPs 
especially with accrual accounting adopters. The need for transparent and precise accounts 
of PPP transactions makes accounting for PPPs quite challenging. Since the GoM does not 
comply with accrual accounting, it is not restricted by these issues which allow the GoM to 
go for PPPs more progressively but with no transparency.  
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7. Other issues of PPPs 
 
Each procurement method comes with their own sets of challenges and issues. Accordingly, 
there are challenges in justifying PPP-adoption, in working the best features for PPP 
framework, in allocating risks, in evaluating performance, and in accounting for PPPs. It is 
the intention of this chapter to point some of these out, in particular accountability, 
financing challenges, public opinion and tolling, and a government‘s obligation towards 
nation development. 
 
 
7.1. Accountability 
 
Accountability remains one of the main PPP issues. Australia noted that barriers to public 
accountability in PPPs include the diffusion of disclosure resulting from multiple reporting 
entities; uncertainties surrounding the mechanics of risk transfer; and the opportunistic use by 
governments of commercial confidentiality clauses (English & Guthrie, 2006, p. 13). 
Furthermore, findings by three Australian Public Accounts Committees show that governments 
themselves insist on the lack of disclosure, not private contractors (English & Guthrie, 2006, p. 
13). As shown in chapter 6, lack of disclosure has induced excessive off-balance sheet 
accounting treatment and allow for more PPPs without having to worry about being 
scrutinized. This is especially so in Malaysia since modified cash basis accounting allows 
selective information to remain hidden; unlike New Zealand‘s accrual accounting that 
promotes transparency. Plus, concerns have been raised over potential erosion of the service 
ethic and ethos of the public sector (Plant, 2003, p. 560) because the private sector interest 
in public goods and services could potentially taint the characteristics of the public sector 
which include motivation, professionalism, trust, impartiality, and judgment (Plant, 2003, p. 
561-564) as discretion and judgment are indispensable (Plant, 2003, p. 577). Whilst 
discretion, choice, personal judgement, and experience run the private sector environment, 
the public sector works for the general public which can be complex and abstract e.g. good 
education (Plant, 2003, p. 565-566). However, this does not mean that one sector is purer 
than the other, as it only shows that the partners operate in different environments. The 
concern here is the perception that the drivers for both sectors could have infused under 
PPPs, thus disrupting public accountability. Plant (2003, p. 564) emphasizes that it is 
difficult to see how cooperation will work without the public sector ethic being 
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transformed out of all recognition. Plant also pointed the blurred line between policy and 
implementation which could have triggered accountability loss (Plant, 2003, P. 574): 
…some asymmetry in motivation between those who write the contract and those 
who implement it because the latter may have an incentive to use their discretion … 
in a way not wholly consistent with the policy defined in the contract itself … there 
has to be a high degree of trust between the state as the contracting party and the 
private sector body as the contractor (Plant, 2003, p 575).  
 
This shows the vulnerability of contracting with fundamentally different motivations. Plant 
added that a contract works best with trust, promise-keeping, truth-telling, respect and 
integrity (Plant, 2003, p. 576). In working out accountability, trust will need to be sorted 
out first as the rest of the contract will be influenced by trustworthiness of both partners. 
Obviously, trust influences accountability.  
 
Both in New Zealand and Malaysia, public services and infrastructure are essentially the 
responsibility of the respective governments regardless of procurement arrangement. 
According to the OAG (2006, p. 24), despite partnering arrangements, the government 
continues to be responsible and accountable for the project or service to protect public 
benefit. Aziz Bahaman as vice President of Master Builders Association Malaysia said that 
even in a PFI, GoM continues to be responsible for providing the service to the public 
(Yusoff, 2007). Therefore, a PPP does not release the public agencies from their 
responsibilities as it merely assists them in performing their duties. This informs the 
inability to totally transfer risk.  
 
In New Zealand, the OAG requires public entities to provide complete and accurate 
accounts of public funds spending even if the funds had been passed on to others (OAG, 
2008a, p. 9). In finalizing a PPP contract, the public sector should therefore consider 
requirements for access to information as contained in the Official Information Act 1982, 
Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987, audit and other public 
accountability requirements such as the Public Audit Act 2001 (OAG, 2006, p. 41). The 
rights of each partner to information and reporting requirements need careful and accurate 
specification in the contract, on top of the limits of commercial confidentiality as these will 
affect responsibility and accountability.  
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In Malaysia, accountability is challenged by money politics where money rules almost 
everything. Accountability deficiency may point to unethical behaviour that relates to 
information asymmetry, collusion, conflict of interest and political financing (OECD, 2008, 
p. 122-123). An article by Teh (2002, p. 345) showed that Malaysia has the adequate laws 
to control money politics but due to non-compliance by both the politicians and the general 
public, the problem continues. This indicates that the major problem lies in law 
enforcement. Laws would be useless unless enforced. Otherwise, accountability in 
Malaysia can easily be bought.  
 
 
7.2. Financing challenges 
 
Another challenge in pursuing PPPs lies in private financing. Newberry believes that PPPs 
will be more expensive than if the government were to borrow and build the buildings 
itself because effectively taxpayers will be paying for them (Partnership report card varied, 
2007, p. 15). Since most PPPs are financed through heavy borrowing by the private sector 
partner who always pays higher interest rates than a government, PPP projects are deemed 
costly (The Press, 2008). Fletcher claims that many New Zealand projects are too small for 
a PPP arrangement because a PPP is normally intended for large and expensive projects, 
thus causing the concern about PPP costs since the market had not really developed 
(Gibson, 2008). Indeed, if only the difference in interest rates payment is looked at, the 
private sector partner would have paid more interest. However, it has been argued that if 
the whole costs of undertaking the project are considered, it would be cheaper to have the 
project delivered via a PPP since theoretically a PPP is undertaken after PSC evaluation 
shows that VFM is achievable. NIU (2009, p. 16-21) clarifies that there is no reason to 
believe that the government‘s cost of capital is lower than the private sector‘s cost of 
capital because: 
1. Refinancing gains are shared between the government and the private party to 
reduce the perception that the contractors are making excessive profits;  
2. The total cost of capital, the sum of the cost of debt and the cost of equity, matters 
more than the assertion that the government‘s cost of borrowing is less than the 
private sector‘s; and 
3. The excessive risk premium demanded by private sector investors does not relate to 
government‘s lower cost of capital because if private sector investors demand a 
high risk premium, presumably they will also demand it when investing in 
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government projects by way of the taxpayer guarantee associated with government 
borrowing. 
 
This clarification however, does not explicitly deny that government‘s cost of capital is 
lower than the private sector‘s. Recall that a PPP may only be pursued when there is an 
absolute need for it (as mentioned in chapter 3). In other words, the cost of capital will not 
matter if a PPP could deliver better services better than the government. The real issue here 
could be that with PPPs, the end users might have to pay for services that some argue they 
have already paid for via taxes. However, in utilizing a PPP, it has been advised that 
resources allocation that does not go to a PPP because of private financing will go to other 
pivotal projects. Consequently, it is presumed that more projects can be done to fulfil 
societal need.  
 
 
7.3. Public opinion and tolling 
 
Adverse reaction to tolling is the main reason roading-related PPPs are rejected. The 
Waterview Connection Steering Group reported conflicts to tolling which is consistent 
with international experiences (Report of the Waterview Connection Steering Group, 2008, 
p. 26). The public opposition to tolling may be influenced by a self fulfilling theory and 
also by what they perceive as reasonable toll rates. However, the public appear to be more 
willing to accept tolling when they have accepted the fact that new roads could not be 
constructed without toll revenue (Report of the Waterview Connection Steering Group, 
2008, p. 26). Auckland Green Party MP Keith Locke criticized the recommendation to 
build the Waterview Connection using a PPP as too expensive, a projected cost of $1.9 
billion, for a mere 4.5 kilometre motorway that is not urgently needed.  
 
Overseas experience shows that private sector involvement does not make the projects 
more cost effective, partly because private sector partners always protect themselves 
contractually against uncertainties (Locke, 2008). Having predicted that any private sector 
entities would want to prudently protect themselves against the risks allocated to them, it 
seems logical for the general public to defy PPPs. Thus a PPP implementation should be 
made as transparent as possible to avoid misjudgements among the end users about PPPs. 
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According to Fletcher, PPPs would be a retrograde step for New Zealand because PPPs are 
time consuming especially in setting up legal framework between participants (Gibson, 
2008). This means it would be likely that a project will have to be delayed until both 
partners are satisfied with the contractual terms. Broadbent and Laughlin (2003, pp. 336) 
address the private sector partners scepticism against public service provision mainly 
because they clash with, the values and ethos of the public sector since they prioritize 
profitability and their shareholders. This issue is commonly brought up. It is quite likely 
that in detailing contract terms, both partners have come up with a solution that evenly 
weight respective motivation for undertaking the projects. It is then becomes the 
responsibility of the public sector partner to ensure that its partners are on the agreed track.  
 
Two major public consultations and market research show that 64 per cent of public 
surveyed supported the proposal on the development of Vector Arena as a PPP whilst 34 
per cent did not (Auckland City Council Annual Report 2008/09, 2009). Although not 
everyone is supportive of Vector Arena being delivered and operated by a private sector 
entity, it shows that there are supporters of PPPs in New Zealand.  
 
Takim et al. (2008, pp. 71) studied the acceptability of PFI in Malaysia using a 
questionnaire survey to public and private sectors in Malaysia and noted the need to reduce 
the length of time, the use of excessive budgets, the problems of cost overruns, and the 
delivery of inferior works and substandard construction products. Although a PPP could 
potentially provide these needs, the public is concerned that the adoption of PPPs would 
mean less disposable income or savings for them whilst the private sector enjoys excessive 
profits. This is mainly driven by the concern that the private sector, being profit-driven, 
will try to make profit from the public money eventually either by charging the public 
more than necessary or by having the government to bail the project out when faced with 
failures. Also, given that the public pays taxes and other funds to the government, it will 
only make sense for the government to utilize the paid taxes rather than having the public 
to pay extra for the private sector delivered infrastructure, additional to the obliged taxes. 
Aversions to PPPs may originate from lack of exposure on PPP implementation along with 
the news on PPP failures. Therefore, it would be a good idea to educate the public on PPPs. 
 
The Malaysians have always been curious about toll concessionaires in Malaysia and there 
has been increasing demands for this information. In response, the GoM succumbed to the 
demands and declassified toll concessionaire agreements since 5 January 2009. The 
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declassification however, raises more questions in need of answers as stated by Yeow and 
Mokhtar (2009). This is because of the lack of standardized approach in dealing with 
concessionaires, the absence of a formula to calculate compensation to keep toll rates 
affordable, and the high dependency of the concessionaires on government loans (Yeow & 
Mokhtar, 2009). Further, there is a restriction on this declassification due to private sector 
involvement which warrant some degrees of commercial confidentiality. Consequently, 
although the documents can be viewed in person, these documents are not to be published 
online and no copies can be made from the original documents.  
 
 
7.4. Towards equitable nation development  
 
An issue of PPPs in Malaysia lies in the preference for small bumiputera contractors. This 
is because 60% of all capital works should be awarded to bumiputera entrepreneurs whose 
financing and constructing capability is perceived as dubious (Jayaseelan and Tan, 2006, 
pp. 97). This raises the concern that Malaysia‘s PFI may be futile since the allocated RM20 
billion prioritized to small bumiputera entrepreneurs whose ability to deliver on time and 
on budget is questionable. They believed that the allocated RM20 billion should have been 
given to the financially secured big players, thus exempting EPF involvement in PFI 
(Jayaseelan & Tan, 2006, p. 97). Gunasegaram added that most of the small bumiputera 
contractors subcontract to the real contractors and that substandard results are caused by 
too little money for the real contractor at the end of the line (Gunasegaram, 2006, p. 100). 
To fight off this scepticism, interested small bumiputera contractors will have to 
continuously perform well for the competitive tender and bidding process.  
According to Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2010 (2006, p. 228) only capable entrepreneurs 
were selected to undertake construction works and participate in vendor development 
programmes. These would have eliminated the less capable ones. Jayaseelan and Tan 
(2006, p. 97) referred to the UK success which requires competitive tendering, sound 
bidding process and strict performance-based payment to the private parties. They hinted at 
the concern that tendering process, bidding process and performance based payment could 
have been manipulated for bumiputera contractors. PFI Sdn Bhd
46
 will provide financing 
to successful project bidders, which are expected to be privately held ethnic Malay 
                                               
46 A special purpose firm established by the Finance Ministry will be tasked with implementing the new 
investment vehicles. 
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consortiums, which will manage all aspects of the project (Netto, 2006). Also, P 
Gunasegaram (group executive editor of the business weekly, the Edge) said (Netto, 2006): 
The [ethnic Malay] contacting community is a strong lobby group within UMNO 
[United Malays National Organization, the dominant party in the ruling coalition] 
but that does not mean the government has to cater to them by putting together a 
scheme that will benefit them and give them access to funds when of them may not 
deserve it  
 
Many seem to believe that EPF is meant to especially help the small bumiputera 
contractors and this belief is partly true. According to Ismail & Md. Yusof (2009b, p. 85) it 
is the intention of the GoM to assist capable bumiputera contractors. However, there is 
more. …even if it is government policy to protect the contractors and to give them more 
experience, arrangements can be made on multi-racial grounds to ensure that both the big 
and small contractors are adequately catered for (Beh, 2010, S80). It is possible for the 
small contractors to experience PPPs as preparation for future competency, although 
simultaneously the financial aid could potentially compromise the true PFI during this 
‗trial‘ period. However, in considering globalization, every business needs to be 
competitive to survive the global market. Hence, it is necessary to elevate local 
competition.  
 
Curiosity might originate on the question of how PPPs can flourish with Malaysia‘s modest 
market size and the perception that Malaysia is descending the Transparency 
International‘s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) which could limit PFI growth in 
Malaysia (The Edge, 2009b). Moreover, GoM‘s efforts to combat corruption are not likely 
to be fruitful anytime soon (Beh, 2010, p. S80). According to Azmi & Associates (2008), 
since PFI has been associated with corruption, nepotism, cronyism and ‘bail-out’-ism, as 
of 9MP, GoM abolishes ‘bail-out’-ism and focuses on stricter requirements and penalties 
for quality and capability. Most importantly, GoM needs the political will to defy those 
whose interest could be compromised (Azmi & Associates, 2008). Although, the ‘bail-
out’-ism allows uninterrupted public services, the chosen private sector partners should not 
have needed bailing out. However, GoM may intervene under predetermined conditions 
(Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2010, 2006, pp. 226-227).  
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Some authors condemn this bailing out activities as the public benefit is at stake, a 
government cannot afford to let public service haltered on the account of the private sector 
partner‘s failure to deliver. To a degree, it might be onerous for the private sector partner, 
to deliver highest quality at government‘s limited budget. Because of this, the chosen 
bidders should ideally have high reputation with large capital and able to fund the 
construction. On the other hand, partnering with the government for a long term ensures 
the on-going of the companies because of the longevity of a government.  
 
Yong and Chew (2006) suggested that GoM tackles the following challenges: 
1. strengthen the institutional framework or adopt new comprehensive legislation to 
govern the PPP and PFI;  
2. the government should discourage evaluating unsolicited proposals from the private 
sector unless they are prepared to be subject to an objective and rigorous financial, 
technical and legal evaluation; 
3. set clear guidelines and procedures for all user-ministries, to ensure consistency in 
implementation; 
4. set up clear regulations and empower the regulators through legislation and 
capacity-building to enable stringent marking of privatized entities to performers; 
and 
5. address the mismatch in terms of short term borrowing versus long term payments 
for PFI projects i.e. long term financing schemes through local financial institutions 
including the EPF. 
 
7.5. Summary 
 
With greater acceptability, it is fair to expect that challenges to PPP implementation would 
decline. This is because the commotion about PPPs appears to be due to the idea of relying 
on the private sector for public assets and services. It is thus the responsibility of both 
sectors to justify the need for PPPs clearly. The challenges in choosing and using PPPs 
may change over time and across countries. As each challenge is addressed, a new 
challenge could surface. Most of these challenges are similar and countries which have 
undergone such challenges may choose to share their experiences with other countries. For 
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example, prior to VFM recognition, the UK and Australia had stumbled upon many PPP 
failures. By publicizing about VFM, other countries can learn about PPP implementation 
better with less cost.  
 
Some of these challenges to implement PPPs are initiated from the reactions of the 
concerned public. Public support is important for PPPs, especially with key public services 
such as transport or access to water. In light of the challenges presented previously, how 
does the general public react to PPP? The support of stakeholders who are directly affected 
by the creation of PPPs such as the public or employees is vital. If public opposition is 
large, support from political authorities for PPPs may dither, thus increasing the political 
risk of the PPP. This might dissuade private sector from participating in PPPs, thereby 
reducing competitiveness for the PPP project and subsequently undermining VFM. 
Therefore, in addition to performing the ex ante financial and risk analyses, a government 
should further the ex ante exercise to engage with all possible stakeholders for support 
(OECD, 2008, p. 118). 
 
One of the ways to deal with these challenges requires thorough consideration of the 
following procurement stages which are vulnerable to corruption (OECD, 2008, p. 124): 
1. the selection of consultants;   
2. the design and preparation of tender documents; 
3. the actual bidding procedure; distinguish the risk factors for competitive bidding, 
restrictive competitive bidding and direct acquisition. The rules of competitive 
bidding can be short-circuited e.g. the setting of a brief timeframe, insufficient 
publication, and biased design;  
4. the decision phase; and 
5. should not underestimate risks in the actual execution phase. 
 
These stages are delicate and every decision made in each stage will influence the 
following stages and ultimately affect the overall project performance. Thus these must be 
closely inspected to filter against self-interested parties and measures against corruption 
should be in place. It is crucial that each stage should be as transparent as possible so the 
best decision can be made. Otherwise PPPs undertaken without proper deliberation could 
lead to poor public accountability, a reduction in competition and development of 
monopolies (Ismail & Md. Yusof, 2009b, p. 76). All of these could induce moral hazard 
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problems which would negatively affect integrity and reputation of everyone involved, 
hence adversely affect the rationality for PPPs. 
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8. Conclusion  
 
This thesis has reviewed literature in order to understand the reasons behind Malaysia 
having more PPPs in New Zealand when both countries have a PPP-specialized unit, PPPs 
guidelines and acknowledgment of the potential of PPPs. In order to understand this trend, 
this thesis has presented issues relating to the reasons for PPPs, features of PPPs, risk 
allocation, performance indicators, accounting for PPPs and other issues relevant to PPPs. 
 
It can be seen that rational choice theory is a prime reason to enter PPPs. That is, the public 
and private sector partners seek to optimize infrastructure and service delivery amidst the 
constraints related to providing public services. By joining forces, the public and private 
sector partners can minimize risks and maximize resources towards high quality public 
service provision. Theoretically this explains countries‘ preference for PPPs. 
 
However the impact of transaction cost economics is also visible. Partners have limited 
knowledge about public service delivery especially because of the long term provision. 
This relates to bounded rationality that limits perfect knowledge to everything. This 
problem is heightened by opportunism whereby both sectors are prone to act 
opportunistically to pursue their self-interests which causes clashes in partnerships. 
Ultimately, this will adversely affect a PPP project and eventually cause failures that are 
costly and burdensome to taxpayers. This could be the reason for New Zealand to have 
limited number of PPPs that are localized.    
 
Although both New Zealand and Malaysia each have a PPP-specialized unit that has 
published PPP guidelines in the same year, Malaysia has taken on more PPPs than New 
Zealand. The reason behind this is led by the motivation to pursue PPPs. While PPPs are 
entered into to deliver high quality infrastructure, Malaysia has a goal (Vision 2020) for 
more infrastructure that can only be achieved by involving private sector in public service 
provisions. Past experiences with its privatization programmes also act as a catalyst for 
more PPPs to achieve this goal.  
 
Conversely, PPPs in New Zealand are limited by the aversion of including private sector 
entities in public service provision. Additionally, New Zealand‘s legislation is embedded 
with some constraints against PPPs and these constraints are accompanied by a number of 
stages that must be satisfied before a PPP can be considered. Such constraints are absent in 
P a g e  | 92 
 
 
Malaysia as the government is convinced that PPPs can accelerate national development 
and hence the government has been encouraging the private sector entities to enter into 
PPP arrangements with the public sector (especially bumiputera contractors). Although the 
private sector financing has been argued as expensive, there is some merit to undertaking 
PPPs. The Government of Malaysia would not require EPF to help with PPP financing, had 
PPPs been worthless. Plus, even if the government could undertake the projects more 
cheaply, if the money is not there, then, it would not matter.   
 
The issue with illusory risks transfer has also contributed to New Zealand not having more 
PPPs. Although Malaysia is also facing the same issue, seeing that the government is pro-
PPPs, the threat of illusory risks transfer does not seem to bother the Malaysians as much 
as EPF funding these PPPs. There has not been a definite way to detect the flow of risks to 
determine whether they have been transferred. However, if risks have been successfully 
transferred and borne correctly, then the end result will reflect this. Otherwise, it could 
signal illusory risk transfer or poor risk management. When it comes to performance 
indicators, as New Zealand is more concerned about the overall performance management 
including KPIs, Malaysia is too focussed on developing the perfect set of KPIs which will 
be better developed from more PPP experiences. Moreover, Malaysia‘s accounting for 
PPPs by the public sector is much more secretive than New Zealand‘s, which makes it 
easier for the government take on more PPPs without attracting too many criticisms from 
the general public.  
 
The conclusion of this paper is restricted to the examples presented in discussing PPPs in 
New Zealand and Malaysia as issues are selected based on their assistance in 
comprehending PPPs in New Zealand and Malaysia. It is not the intention of this paper to 
cover all PPP arrangements and all issues pertaining to every type of PPPs. Therefore this 
conclusion may not be relevant to all PPPs in these countries. Since PPP guidelines are 
subjected to on-going revision, the relevance and reliability of this paper rely on the 
current acceptable framework and practices of PPP. Further research including gathering 
data on organisations‘ experiences would be useful and the way in which rational choice 
theory informs their decisions. 
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Appendix A 
 
A completed PPP proposal should go directly to the relevant ministries or agencies 
detailing these (3PU, 2009, p. 7-8): 
1. An executive summary of the submission  
2. An evidence of financial stability and statement of financial capability, including 
access to capital (debt and equity), and Letters of Support from potential lenders  
3. A statement of performance capability with an overview of overall experience, 
experience in similar projects, senior management expertise, expertise of those staff 
members who will work on the project, ability to obtain necessary resources and 
references  
4. Results of economic, financial and engineering feasibility studies, including socio-
economic cost benefit analysis (SCBA)  
5. A business plan, including: partnership structure; duration of the proposed 
partnership; ownership (present and future); terms of payment; maintenance costs; 
reserves that need to be kept by the private partner; risk management, including that 
of force majeure; risk transfer from the government to the private sector partner; 
economic benefits to the government  
6. A financial plan, including: detailed cost schedule; financial structure; potential 
partner‘s sources of funding; how improvements, upgrades and modifications will 
be financed; pro forma financial statements  
7. The PPP modality options and the preferred option, concession period, risk analysis 
and allocation and financing scheme  
8. The proposed payment mechanism based on service-delivery output specifications 
and KPIs. For infrastructure or service delivery partnerships where public user fees 
will be a source of revenue, a detailed year-by-year description of future user fees 
and their justifications. Include results of public interest surveys, if any  
9. Additional information required will be available in the specific tender document of 
the project 
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Appendix B 
 
References to New Zealand equivalent to IFRIC Interpretation 12 Service Concession 
Arrangements include (NZ IFRIC 12) (NZICA, 2008, p. 6): 
1. NZ Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements 
2. NZ IFRS 1 First-time Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards 
3. NZ IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures 
4. NZ IAS 8 Accounting Policies, Changes in Accounting Estimates and Errors 
5. NZ IAS 11 Construction Contracts  
6. NZ IAS 16 Property, Plant and Equipment  
7. NZ IAS 17 Leases 
8. NZ IAS 18 Revenue 
9. NZ IAS 20 Accounting for Government Grants and Disclosure of Government 
Assistance 
10. NZ IAS 23 Borrowing Costs 
11. NZ IAS 32 Financial Instruments: Presentation 
12. NZ IAS 36 Impairment of Assets 
13. NZ IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets 
14. NZ IAS 38 Intangible Assets 
15. NZ IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement 
16. NZ IFRIC 4 Determining whether an Arrangement contains a Lease 
17. NZ SIC-29 Service Concession Arrangements – Disclosures 
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